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A COMMON PROPOSAL 
Stacey A. Tovino* 
ABSTRACT 
The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (the 
Common Rule) is codified in separate regulations by seventeen 
federal departments and agencies, including the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS). HHSs version of the 
Common Rule currently contains a basic policy for the protection 
of all human subjects, codified at Subpart A of the Common Rule, 
as well as special provisions governing human subjects research 
involving three sets of vulnerable populations, including 
pregnant women, fetuses, and neonates (Subpart B); prisoners 
(Subpart C); and children (Subpart D). This Article proposes that 
HHS amend the Common Rule to add a new Subpart E governing 
human subjects research involving adults with impaired 
decision-making capacity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article responds to the recent request by the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for guidance 
regarding how regulations for protecting human subjects who 
participate in research might be modernized and revised to be 
more effective.1 As background, current federal regulations 
governing human subjects research were developed decades ago 
when research studies were generally conducted at one research 
site, such as a single university or a single medical center.2 
Although HHS has amended its regulations over the years, the 
regulations have not kept pace with the evolving human 
research enterprise, including the marked increase in the 
volume of biomedical and behavioral research; the proliferation 
of multi-site clinical trials and observational studies; the 
expansion of research in particular areas, including neurology 
and psychiatry; and the use of new research technologies, 
                                            
 1. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 
44,512, 44,512 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164; 21 
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56). 
 2. See id. 
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including functional magnetic resonance imaging.3 Stakeholders 
have criticized the decades-old regulations on many grounds, 
including the extent and quality of the protections afforded by 
the regulations consent provisions, the lack of calibration 
between the risks posed by a particular research protocol and the 
required level of institutional review, and the multiple [and] 
differing regulatory requirements that can apply to a single 
research study.4 
This Article focuses on one particular area of regulatory 
criticism; that is, the lack of federal regulation and the 
patchwork of state regulation in the context of human subjects 
research involving adults5 with impaired decision-making 
capacity, including adults with neurological, psychiatric, and 
developmental conditions.6 Elsewhere, others7 and I8 have 
reviewed the American history of human subjects research, 
including research studies in which scientists enrolled captive 
populations of vulnerable individuals in dangerous experiments, 
the goals of which were unrelated to the individuals health 
conditions.9 Many individuals with neurological, psychiatric, and 
                                            
 3. See id. at 44,51213. 
 4. See id. at 44,51314. 
 5. HHS-conducted or -supported human subjects research involving children is 
already regulated at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401409 (2011). 
 6. Individuals with impaired decision-making capacity include, but are not limited 
to (1) individuals with disorders of consciousness, such as coma, vegetative state, and 
minimally conscious state, that eliminate or severely impair cognitive abilities; 
(2) individuals with neurological conditions, such as dementia, that may impair some or 
all cognitive abilities; (3) individuals with psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia, 
that may impair some or all cognitive abilities; and (4) individuals with developmental 
and intellectual disabilities, such as mental retardation, that may impair some cognitive 
abilities. See infra notes 24, 27, 118122, 162 and accompanying text. 
 7. For a history of human subjects research in the United States, see, for example, 
GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 1275 (1992) CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE 
ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 3239 (2005); CYNTHIA 
MCGUIRE DUNN & GARY L. CHADWICK, PROTECTING STUDY VOLUNTEERS IN RESEARCH 1
16 (4th ed. 2012); MARGARET L. EATON & DONALD KENNEDY, INNOVATION IN MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGY: ETHICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 3746 (2007); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. 
BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 151232 (1986); JONATHAN 
D. MORENO, IS THERE AN ETHICIST IN THE HOUSE?: ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF BIOETHICS 
10952 (2005); LAINIE FRIEDMAN ROSS, CHILDREN IN MEDICAL RESEARCH 1243 (2006); 
THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 1144 (Harold Y. Vanderpool ed., 
1996). 
 8. See Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of Consciousness: 
Moral Imperative or Legal and Ethics Failure?, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2242 (2008), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol13/issue1/v13i1_a2-Tovino.pdf (providing an abbreviated history of 
human subjects research involving vulnerable populations). 
 9. In the early 1950s, for example, the U.S. Army Chemical Center investigated 
the use of hallucinogenic compounds as potential chemical warfare agents on a confined 
populationthe patients at the New York State Psychiatric Institute (the Institute). 
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developmental disabilities died or became ill as a result of their 
research inclusion.10 In light of this history, some stakeholders 
have called for stronger legal protections for human subjects who 
have impaired decision-making capacity.11 Other stakeholders, 
including many clinicians and scientists, support further 
biomedical and behavioral research involving individuals with 
impaired decision-making capacity in order to contribute to 
generalizable knowledge regarding the individuals underlying 
physical and mental health conditions.12 Two particular questions 
                                            
Barrett v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Pursuant to the Armys 
research protocol, Institute patients were injected with chemical derivatives of mescaline, 
a hallucinogenic alkaloid of the phenethylamine class, and clinical response data was 
provided by the Institute to the Army. See id. at 129496. At least one research subjecta 
former tennis professional and ranked tennis player named Harold Blauer, who was 
receiving psychiatric care at the Institute for major depression and pseudo-neurotic 
schizophreniadied following his fifth mescaline injection. Id. at 1298300, 1317. The 
purpose of the research was not to develop a treatment or cure for depression or the other 
conditions with which the Institute patients were diagnosed; instead, the research was 
designed to provide a firmer basis for the utilization of psychochemical agents . . . for 
offensive use as sabotage weapons and to develop protections against the psychochemical 
agents in military activity. Id. at 1295, 1299 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Historians, ethicists and law professors who subsequently reviewed the Armys chemical 
warfare research have concluded that it posed risks to Blauer and his fellow subjects that 
were unreasonable in relation to the military knowledge that was expected to result, that 
the research was inappropriately conducted in a captive and vulnerable population of 
individuals with mental illness whose further treatment was conditioned on participation 
in the dangerous research protocol, that the researchers failed to inform the research 
subjects of the military purpose of the experiment and of the known risks associated with 
mescaline, and that some of the research subjects may not have had the capacity to give 
consent due to their severe mental illnesses. See, e.g., Cyril H. Wecht, Research and 
Experimentation, in LEGAL MEDICINE 175, 176 (S. Sandy Sanbar, ed., 7th ed. 2007) 
Moreno, supra note 7, at 15962; Tovino, supra note 8, at 2729; see also FADEN & 
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 7, at 159. 
 10. See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 8, at 23, 2931. 
 11. See, e.g., Stefan Eriksson, On the Need for Improved Protections of Incapacitated 
and Non-Benefiting Research Subjects, 26 BIOETHICS 15, 15 2021 (2012) ([T]he present 
guidelines allow for the possibility of vulnerable people being exploited, something that is 
hidden behind a guise of solidarity. Instead we need to address the real issues at stake by 
rewriting these statutes. . . . However, in order to protect these subjects there is 
additional need for appointed representatives who monitor research and for legal 
obligations to compensate for any injuries suffered. Without these or similar 
measures . . . we wont have an adequate system in place for the protection of non-
benefiting persons who are unable to consent to research.); PRESIDENTIAL COMMN FOR 
THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, MORAL SCIENCE: PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN HUMAN 
SUBJECTS RESEARCH 5 (2011) ([T]he Commission cannot conclude that all federally 
funded research provides optimal protections against avoidable harms and unethical 
treatment. The Commission finds significant room for improvement in several areas 
where, for example, immediate changes can be made to increase accountability and 
thereby reduce the likelihood of harm or unethical treatment.). 
 12. See, e.g., Scott Y.H. Kim et al., Proxy and Surrogate Consent in Geriatric 
Neuropsychiatric Research: Update and Recommendations, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 797, 
797 (2004) (There is evidence that conservative risk management strategies by 
institutional review boards and their institutions may severely restrict research with 
decisionally impaired subjects.); Elyn R. Saks et al., Proxy Consent to Research: The 
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over which academic and professional stakeholders (including 
law professors, ethicists, clinicians, and scientists) frequently 
disagree include the general question of how human subjects 
research involving adults with impaired decision-making 
capacity should be regulated at the federal and state level and 
the more specific question of who, if anyone, should be permitted 
to consent to research on behalf of adults who have very impaired 
or no decision-making capacity.13 
On July 26, 2011, HHS issued an Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) requesting public comments on 
proposals to seven areas of current federal regulation as well as 
answers to seventy-four specific questions relating to human 
subjects research.14 Through its proposal of new federal 
regulations governing human subjects research involving adults 
with impaired decision-making capacity, this Article responds to 
one of HHSs broad proposals relating to improvement of the 
consent process15 and three of HHSs specific questions relating to 
the adequacy of consent forms, the level of research participant 
comprehension required, and the desirability of additional 
consent process requirements.16 
                                            
Legal Landscape, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POLY L. & ETHICS 37, 39 (2008) (It is urgent that 
research on [Alzheimers] disease be strongly encouraged and facilitated.); Douglas 
Steinberg, Consciousness Is Missingand So Is Research, 6 EMBO REP. 1009, 1011 
(2005) ([S]ome observers see a moral imperative, not just an ethical trap, in the study of 
consciousness disorders.). 
 13. See, e.g., Evan G. DeRenzo, Decisionally Impaired Persons in Research: Refining 
the Proposed Refinements, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 139, 139 (1997) (The ethics of involving 
persons with cognitive impairments and/or mental illness in research continues to gain 
academic and public attention. . . . [Relevant questions include] not only when and from 
whom informed consent may be obtained but also under what conditions it is ethically 
permissible to involve persons in research who are too decisionally impaired to provide 
their own consent.); Saks et al., supra note 12, at 39 (When an adult suffers from a 
disorder that impairs his or her capacity to consent, may another person enroll that 
individual in research? The answer, it appears, is not a simple yes or no, but rather it 
depends.). 
 14. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 
44,512, 44,514, 44,51729 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 
160, 164; 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56) (summarizing the seven sets of potential refinements and 
listing the seventy-four specific questions). 
 15. HHSs third broad proposal relates to [i]mprovement of consent forms and the 
consent process. Id. at 44,514. 
 16. HHSs 36th question asks, 
What additional information, if any, should be required by the regulations to 
assure that consent forms appropriately describe to subjects, in concise and clear 
language, alternatives to participating in the research study and why it may or 
may not be in their best interests to participate? What modifications or deletions 
to the required elements would be appropriate? 
Id. at 44,523. HHSs 38th question asks, Should the regulations require that, for certain 
types of studies, investigators assess how well potential research subjects comprehend the 
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part II of this Article 
examines federal and state authorities governing human subjects 
research involving adults with impaired decision-making 
capacity. Part II finds that current federal law does not provide 
specific guidance regarding the conduct of human subjects 
research involving adults with impaired decision-making 
capacity or consent to research by or on behalf of adults with 
impaired decision-making capacity and that state law in this 
area varies widely, when it exists. Part II also finds that the lack 
of federal regulation and the patchwork of state law has made it 
difficult for American scientists, academic medical centers, 
institutional review boards, scientific journals, and funding 
agencies to agree on an applicable ethical and legal framework, 
especially when research may be conducted in a laboratory 
located in one city but will draw research participants who are 
residents of neighboring states, as well as in the context of multi-
site and multi-state research.17 Part II further finds that the 
federal Office for Human Research Protections and some 
members of the clinical and scientific communities support 
reliance on legislation governing consent to treatment in the 
absence of state law specifically addressing consent to research.18 
Given the support by the government and some members of 
the clinical and scientific communities for reliance on legislation 
governing consent to treatment to answer research-related 
questions, Part III of this Article examines and identifies the 
salient features of federal regulation and state legislation 
governing consent to treatment. Part IV argues that legislation 
governing consent to treatment should not be used to answer 
questions relating to consent to research because (i) treatment 
and research are intrinsically different activities; 
(ii) government-supported reliance on legislation governing 
consent to treatment to answer questions relating to consent to 
research could provide continued legal and conceptual support 
for the therapeutic misconception; and (iii) the content of 
legislation governing consent to treatment may be inappropriate 
for research-related questions in light of the unique role of the 
researcherthat is, the role of collecting data and reporting 
research results, not holding the best physical and mental health 
                                            
information provided to them before they are allowed to sign the consent form? Id. HHSs 
40th question asks, Would informed consent be improved if the regulations included 
additional requirements regarding the consent process, and if so, what should be 
required? For example, should investigators be required to disclose in consent forms 
certain information about the financial relationships they have with study sponsors? Id. 
 17. See infra text accompanying note 99. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 113114. 
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interests of research participants as paramount. To support the 
argument that legislation governing consent to treatment should 
not be used to answer questions relating to consent to research, 
Part IV references and relies on other areas of health law that 
distinguish treatment and research and establish more stringent 
requirements for research. 
Part V of this Article finds that the current law review and 
other academic literatures tend to polarize conversations about 
the regulation of human subjects research involving adults with 
impaired decision-making capacity into strong protection-based 
arguments, on the one hand, and clinical- and research-based 
arguments made in support of further biomedical and behavioral 
research, on the other.19 Part V contends that the literature could 
benefit from a more well-rounded dialogue that includes insights 
from not only law professors, ethicists, clinicians, and scientists, 
but also from laypersons, including current and future patients 
and human subjects.20 Stated slightly differently, Part V suggests 
that lawmakers will continue to struggle crafting regulations 
that protect and promote the autonomy of laypersons until 
lawmakers better understand (i) the conditions under which 
laypersons would consent to participate in research, including 
riskless and risky research; (ii) whether and when laypersons 
would grant a surrogate the authority to make a substituted 
research participation decision; and (iii) the amount of leeway 
laypersons would give to surrogates in making substituted 
research participation decisions. 
To this end, Part V analyzes empirical studies investigating 
current public attitudes towards human subjects research 
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity.21 These 
empirical studies report somewhat surprising findings; that is, 
that (i) surrogate consent to research is probably or definitely 
acceptable in the context of minimal risk research; (ii) surrogate 
consent to research may be appropriate in the context of more 
risky studies; (iii) lay (or noncourt-appointed) surrogates should 
be permitted to consent to riskless research on behalf of relatives 
with impaired decision-making capacity; (iv) enrolling 
individuals who are unable to consent to research in research 
studies that offer no potential for medical benefit is consistent 
with the preferences of at least some individuals and, therefore, 
should not be absolutely prohibited provided there is sufficient 
evidence that participation in such research is consistent with 
                                            
 19. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 247248. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 255300. 
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the preferences of such individuals; (v) requiring a completed 
advance research directive (ARD) prior to research participation 
by an individual with impaired decision-making capacity may be 
unduly restrictive in light of studies suggesting that the rate of 
ARD completion is likely to be low; and (vi) allowing some or 
complete surrogate leeway, even over prior first-person consent, 
is consistent with the preferences of at least some individuals 
and should not be absolutely prohibited provided there is 
sufficient evidence that surrogate leeway is consistent with the 
preferences of such individuals.22 
Rather than relabeling legislation governing consent to 
treatment in an attempt to make it applicable to both the 
treatment and research settings, Part VI argues that HHS 
should add a new subpart (a Subpart E) to 45 C.F.R. Part 46 
specifically governing human subjects research involving 
adults with impaired decision-making capacity. The 
regulations proposed in Part VI would reconcile potential 
conflicts of interest between and among researchers, 
surrogates, and adult research participants by requiring 
researchers to recognize themselves and convey to research 
participants and/or surrogates, as appropriate, (i) the 
conceptual distinctions between treatment and research; 
(ii) the specific differences between individualized, adaptable 
treatment methods and protocol-driven, double-blind, 
randomized, placebo-controlled research procedures; (iii) the 
known, suspected, and unknown risks associated with the 
research protocol; and (iv) the likelihood that research 
participants may not directly benefit from the research. 
II. CONSENT-TO-RESEARCH REGULATION 
Investigators whose research is designed to improve 
clinical practice in the areas of neurology, psychiatry, 
geriatrics, emergency medicine, and critical care, among other 
specialties, frequently design research protocols that involve 
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.23 Some of 
                                            
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 249254. 
 23. See, e.g., B. Lynn Beattie, Consent in Alzheimers Disease Research: Risk/Benefit 
Factors, 34 CAN. J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. (SUPP.1) S27, S29 (2007) (noting that research in 
Alzheimers disease is complicated by the disease itself, which affects the subjects 
decision-making capacity for participation in research); Scott Y. H. Kim et al., Assessing 
the Competence of Persons with Alzheimers Disease in Providing Informed Consent for 
Participation in Research, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 712, 712 (2001) (noting that even 
relatively mild Alzheimers disease can significantly impair consent-giving capacity in the 
research context and that research in the field of Alzheimers disease therapeutics 
increasingly includes participation by subjects with relatively mild Alzheimers disease); 
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these protocols involve the neuroimaging of individuals who 
have disorders of consciousness, including coma, vegetative 
state, and minimally conscious state.24 In one recent study, 
scientists from the United Kingdom and Argentina used 
functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the 
neural correlates of motor preparation in response to verbal 
commands in a group of human subjects who met diagnostic 
criteria for vegetative state, defined as the absence of 
awareness of self or the environment and preserved autonomic 
functions.25 In a second recent study, scientists from the 
United Kingdom and Belgium used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging to assess individuals with disorders of 
consciousness with respect to their ability to generate willful, 
                                            
Ukamaka M. Oruche, Research with Cognitively Impaired Participants, 13 J. NURSING L. 
89, 89 (2009) (noting that research involving individuals with cognitive impairments is 
necessary to improve understanding of illnesses such as Alzheimers disease, 
Huntingtons chorea, cerebrovascular disease, psychiatric disorders, chronic alcoholism, 
and AIDS dementia complex). 
 24. See, e.g., M. R. Coleman et al., Towards the Routine Use of Brain Imaging to Aid 
the Clinical Diagnosis of Disorders of Consciousness, 132 BRAIN 2541, 254151 (2009) 
(describing the functional brain imaging findings from a group of forty-one individuals 
with disorders of consciousness who undertook a hierarchical speech processing task, 
concluding that functional neuroimaging has the potential to inform the diagnostic 
decision-making process for persons with disorders of consciousness); Davinia Fernández-
Espejo et al., Combination of Diffusion Tensor and Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging During Recovery from the Vegetative State, BMC NEUROLOGY, Sept. 3, 2010, at 1, 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2377-10-77.pdf (using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging to investigate cortical responses to passive language 
stimulation as well as task-induced deactivations related to the default-mode network in 
one patient in the vegetative state at one month post-ictus and . . . twelve months later 
when he had recovered consciousness); Joseph J. Fins, Neuroethics, Neuroimaging, and 
Disorders of Consciousness: Promise or Peril?, 122 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL & 
CLIMATOLOGICAL ASSN 336, 33637, 33943 (2010) (reviewing research using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography to elucidate brain states); 
Olivia Gosseries et al., Disorders of Consciousness: Whats in a Name? 28 
NEUROREHABILITATION 3, 49 (2011) (summarizing research studies designed to 
investigate the residual neural capacity of individuals with disorders of consciousness) 
Luaba Tshibanda et al., Neuroimaging After Coma, 52 NEURORADIOLOGY 15, 1521 (2010) 
(summarizing research studies using magnetic resonance spectroscopy, diffusion tensor 
imaging, and functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess patients with disorders of 
consciousness); Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse et al., Default Network Connectivity Reflects the 
Level of Consciousness in Non-Communicative Brain-Damaged Patients, 133 BRAIN 161, 
16169 (2010) (using functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate default 
network connectivity in individuals with disorders of consciousness, including coma, 
vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and locked-in syndrome). 
 25. See Tristan Andres Bekinschtein et al., Functional Imaging Reveals 
Movement Preparatory Activity in the Vegetative State, FRONTIERS HUM. 
NEUROSCIENCE, Jan. 27, 2011, at 1, 13, 67 (citation omitted) (reporting results that 
may reflect residual voluntary processing in some patients in the vegetative state 
and suggesting that the identification of such activity using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging may complement more traditional clinical assessments of patients 
in the vegetative state). 
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neuroanatomically specific, blood-oxygenation-level-dependent 
responses during two . . . mental-imagery tasks.26 
Other protocols are designed to investigate the safety and 
efficacy of experimental drugs and other interventions for 
individuals who have mild, moderate, or severe dementia or 
mental illness and may have restricted or limited decision-
making capacity.27 In one recent study, scientists at the 
University of California at San Diego, the University of 
California at Irvine, and Rush University Medical Center in 
Chicago conducted a phase 1 clinical trial of nerve growth factor 
(NGF) gene delivery in eight individuals with early-stage 
probable Alzheimers disease.28 The study involved the 
implantation of autologous fibroblasts genetically modified to 
express human NGF into the subjects forebrains.29 
Still other protocols, especially those designed to improve 
clinical practice in the emergency room, may involve 
experimental interventions for individuals with mild, moderate, 
and severe traumatic brain injuries. In one illustrative study, 
scientists at Koreas Seo-Ulsan Boram Hospital investigated the 
accuracy of diffusion-weighted magnetic resonance imaging in 
assessing unconscious trauma patients when their computed 
                                            
 26. See Martin M. Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of 
Consciousness, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 579, 588 (2010) (concluding that some 
individuals in vegetative or minimally conscious states may have brain activations that 
reflect some awareness and cognition). 
 27. See, e.g., Linda Beuscher & Victoria T. Grando, Challenges in Conducting 
Qualitative Research with Persons with Dementia, 2 RES. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 6, 
67 (2009) (discussing consent to research and other challenging issues raised by the 
conduct of qualitative research involving individuals with dementia); Sabina Gainotti et 
al., How Are the Interests of Incapacitated Research Participants Protected Through 
Legislation? An Italian Study on Legal Agency for Dementia Patients, PLOS, June 2010, 
at 1, 1, http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0011150 
(noting that [r]esearch involving individuals with compromised mental ability can be 
ethically challenging due to their [impaired] ability to give free and informed consent); 
S.Y.H. Kim et al., Surrogate Consent for Dementia Research: A National Survey of Older 
Americans, 72 NEUROLOGY 149, 149 (2009) (Research in novel therapies for Alzheimers 
Disease (AD) relies on persons with AD as research subjects.); Robin Pierce, A Changing 
Landscape for Advance Directives in Dementia Research, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 623, 623, 
629 (2010) (noting that one of the primary challenges to conducting research on 
dementia . . . is the gradual loss of the capacity to consent to research participation by 
individuals with dementia). 
 28. Mark H. Tuszynski et al., A Phase 1 Clinical Trial of Nerve Growth Factor Gene 
Therapy for Alzheimer Disease, 11 NATURE MED. 551, 55152 (2005). 
 29. See id. The study detected no adverse effects attributable to the delivery of 
NGF itself or to the gene-delivery vector after 1824 months of monitoring, including 
weight loss or pain; found that post-experiment functional neuroimaging showed 
significant increases in cortical 18-fluorodeoxyglucose uptake, a reversal of usual decline 
in Alzheimer disease; and concluded that [a]dditional clinical trials of NGF for 
Alzheimer disease are warranted. Id. 
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tomography (CT) brain scans were unremarkable.30 In a second 
study, scientists at Chinas Hangzhou Normal University and 
Zhejiang University investigated the efficacy of unilateral 
decompressive craniectomy and unilateral routine 
temporoparietal craniectomy in reducing intracranial pressure in 
patients with unilateral acute post-traumatic brain injury.31 
Federal and state laws that govern the conduct of research 
studies such as these may best be described as an incomplete 
patchwork.32 As discussed in more detail in Part II.AB, below, 
the federal and state governments have for more than three 
decades swung back and forth between the competing goals of 
protecting vulnerable human subjects and fostering biomedical 
and behavioral health research.33 One result is that federal law 
still does not contain specific regulations governing human 
subjects research involving adults with impaired decision-making 
capacity,34 some states support such research with few 
restrictions,35 and other states prohibit all such research without 
the prospect of either direct medical benefit to the potential 
human subject or obtaining generalizable knowledge about the 
human subjects disorder or condition.36 Issues on which 
stakeholders disagree include (i) whether researchers should be 
required to demonstrate that a research study classified as 
minimal risk37 relates to an individuals psychiatric, neurological, 
                                            
 30. Je Sung You et al., Use of Diffusion-Weighted MRI in the Emergency 
Department for Unconscious Trauma Patients with Negative Brain CT, 27 EMERGENCY 
MED. J. 131, 13132 (2010). 
 31. See Wusi Qiu et al., Effects of Unilateral Decompressive Craniectomy on Patients 
with Unilateral Acute Post-Traumatic Brain Swelling After Severe Traumatic Brain 
Injury, CRITICAL CARE, R185, Nov. 23, 2009, at 1, 12, 45, 
http://ccforum.com/content/pdf/cc8178.pdf (finding that unilateral decompressive 
craniectomy (DC) lowers intracranial pressure, reducing the mortality rate and 
improving neurological outcomes over unilateral routine temporoparietal craniectomy[;] 
also finding that [DC] increases the incidence of delayed intracranial hematomas and 
subdural effusion, some of which need secondary surgical intervention). 
 32. See infra Part II.AB; see also Oruche, supra note 23, at 92 (summarizing gaps 
in federal and state regulation of human subjects research involving individuals with 
cognitive impairments). 
 33. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 27, at 14950 (explaining that policy uncertainties 
have continued for three decades and that policy discussions regarding surrogate-based 
research (SBR) have continued for three decades without a clear resolution). 
 34. See infra Part II.A. 
 35. See infra Part II.B (describing Californias law on such research); see also Carl 
H. Coleman, Research with Decisionally Incapacitated Human Subjects: An Argument for 
a Systematic Approach to Risk-Benefit Analysis, 83 IND. L.J.743, 76061 (2008). 
 36. See infra Part II.B (discussing New Jerseys law on such research). 
 37. HHS defines minimal risk to mean that the probability and magnitude of 
harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than 
those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or 
psychological examinations or tests. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2011). 
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or other condition before an individual with the condition is 
permitted to be enrolled in the research; (ii) whether it is ever 
permissible to enroll individuals with impaired decision-making 
capacity in research classified as greater than minimal risk and, 
if so (A) whether the greater than minimal risk research 
intervention must hold out the prospect of direct benefit to the 
individual; (B) whether the individual is required to have 
executed an advance research directive through which the 
individual gave prior consent to research participation; 
(C) whether a surrogate may consent to the individuals research 
participation in the absence of an advance research directive; and 
(D) whether a special standing panel or other similar body that 
has expertise in research involving individuals with impaired 
decision-making capacity also should be required to review and 
approve the individuals research participation.38 
A. Federal Law 
Over the past three decades, various federal commissions 
and regulatory agencies have provided different responses to 
these questions. On February 2, 1978, the National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research (Commission) issued a report and 
recommendations relating to human subjects research involving 
institutionalized individuals with mental infirmity.39 Among 
other things, the Commission recommended that individuals who 
lack decision-making capacity be allowed to participate in 
minimal risk research, but only if the research related to the 
individuals condition or the individual assents or does not object 
to the research.40 For example, an individual with severe 
dementia but without osteoporosis would be permitted to be 
                                            
 38. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 27, at 149 (noting that policies for surrogate 
consent for research remain unsettled after decades of debate). In 2002, for example, the 
Executive Vice Chancellor of UCLA issued a university-wide moratorium on approval of 
research involving individuals with impaired decision-making capacity unless a court-
appointed conservator consented to the individuals research participation. See Saks et al., 
supra note 12, at 4142 & n.10 (citing Memorandum from Daniel M. Neuman, Executive 
Vice Chancellor, Univ. of Cal., L.A., to the Deans, Department Chairs, Division Chiefs, 
Investigators, and Research Personnel of Univ. of Cal., L.A., RE: Moratorium on IRB 
Approval of Surrogate or Proxy Informed Consent for Human Subjects Research (Sept. 30, 
2002)). Although California law has since been changed to allow surrogates to consent to 
research participation on behalf of individuals with impaired decision-making capacity, 
not all state legislatures agree with the approach taken by California. See infra Part II.B. 
 39. See generally THE NATL COMMN FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE 
INSTITUTIONALIZED AS MENTALLY INFIRM (1978). 
 40. Id. at 78. 
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enrolled in minimal risk dementia research, but not minimal risk 
osteoporosis research. For research that posed greater than 
minimal risk, the Commission recommended that the research 
intervention hold out the prospect of direct benefit to the 
individual.41 For example, the Commission would allow an 
individual with severe depression to be enrolled in greater than 
minimal risk research, but only if the research held out the 
prospect of alleviating the individuals depression. 
Although the former Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) proposed regulations on November 17, 1978, 
based on the Commissions report (Proposed Regulations),42 HEW 
never adopted final regulations addressing research involving 
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.43 The 
Proposed Regulations would have allowed minimal risk research 
involving individuals lacking decision-making capacity to proceed 
if the research was relevant to the individuals condition, the 
individual assented or did not object to research participation, 
and the individuals legally authorized representative (LAR) 
consented to the individuals participation.44 
The Proposed Regulations also would have allowed the 
conduct of greater than minimal risk research involving 
individuals who lack decision-making capacity if the research 
involved an intervention that held out the prospect of direct 
benefit for the individual, the risks were justified by the prospect 
of benefit to the individual, [t]he relation of the risk to 
anticipated benefit . . . [was] at least as favorable as that 
presented by available alternative approaches, the individual 
assented to research participation, and the individuals LAR 
consented to the individuals participation.45 
In addition, the Proposed Regulations would have allowed 
the conduct of greater than minimal risk research involving 
individuals who lack decision-making capacity even if the 
research did not hold out the prospect of direct benefit if the risk 
involved represented a minor increase over minimal risk, the 
anticipated knowledge was of vital importance for understanding 
                                            
 41. Id. at 11. 
 42. Protection of Human Subjects: Proposed Regulations on Research Involving 
Those Institutionalized as Mentally Disabled, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,950, 53,95056 (proposed 
Nov. 17, 1978). 
 43. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101505 (2011) (lacking incorporation of the proposed 
regulations). 
 44. Protection of Human Subjects: Proposed Regulations on Research Involving 
Those Institutionalized as Mentally Disabled, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,955 (proposing 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.505(b)(2)). 
 45. Id. at 53,956 (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.506(a)(1)(4)(ii)). 
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or ameliorating the individuals disorder or condition, and the 
individual gave informed consent to research participation.46 If 
the individual lacked capacity to give informed consent, the 
Commission would require the individual to assent to research 
participation and the individuals LAR to consent to the 
individuals participation.47 If the individual lacked the capacity 
to assent but did not object to research participation, both the 
individuals LAR and a court of competent jurisdiction must 
consent to the individuals participation.48 
Finally, the Proposed Regulations would have allowed the 
conduct of research not otherwise approvable if the research 
presented an opportunity to further the understanding, 
prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the 
individuals health or welfare and the Secretary of HEW, after 
consultation with a panel of experts in pertinent disciplines (e.g., 
science, medicine, education, ethics, law) and following 
opportunity for public review and comment, determined 
that (i) the research would be in accord with basic ethical 
principles of beneficence, justice, and respect for 
persons, (ii) that the research presents a reasonable 
opportunity to further the understanding, prevention, or 
alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of 
individuals institutionalized as mentally disabled, and (iii) that 
[a]dequate provisions [were] made for obtaining consent of those 
[individuals] capable of giving fully informed consent, the assent 
of other [individuals], and the consent of their [LARs], and, 
where appropriate, the authorization of a court of competent 
jurisdiction.49 
On April 18, 1979, the Commission published in the Federal 
Register its Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Research (Belmont Report), which 
identified and examined three basic ethical principles (respect for 
persons, beneficence, and justice) that are relevant to the conduct 
of human subjects research.50 The Belmont Report also 
recognized, however, that (i) special provisions may need to be 
made for research participants with impaired decision-making 
capacity, (ii) the principle of respect for persons may require 
consent to research participation to come from a third party who 
                                            
 46. Id. (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.507(a)(1)(4)(i)). 
 47. Id. (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.507(a)(4)(ii)). 
 48. Id. (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.507(a)(4)(iii)). 
 49. Id. (proposing 45 C.F.R. § 46.508(a)(b)). 
 50. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,19294 (Apr. 18, 1979). 
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is most likely to understand the individuals situation and to act 
in the individuals best interest, and (iii) the third party should 
have the opportunity to observe the research as it proceeds and 
withdraw the individual from the research if withdrawal is in the 
individuals best interest.51 By 1991, a total of seventeen federal 
agencies, including HEW and its successor, HHS, published 
proposed and final regulations governing human subjects 
research (the Common Rule) that were based in large part on 
the three ethical principles identified in the Belmont Report.52 
Today, the Common Rule contains a Basic HHS Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects (Basic Policy), which is codified at 
Subpart A of the Common Rule,53 as well as special provisions 
governing human subjects research involving three sets of 
vulnerable populations, including pregnant women, fetuses, and 
neonates (Subpart B),54 prisoners (Subpart C),55 and children 
(Subpart D).56 
The Common Rule does not, however, contain a special 
subpart governing research involving adults with impaired 
decision-making capacity.57 As a result, proposed research that 
would involve adults with impaired decision-making capacity 
must satisfy only four general provisions set forth in the Basic 
Policy. First, institutional review boards (IRBs) must ensure that 
a researchers selection of subjects for the research protocol is 
equitable.58 In assessing selection equity, the Basic Policy 
instructs reviewing IRBs to be particularly cognizant of the 
special problems of research involving vulnerable populations, 
such as . . . mentally disabled persons.59 The Basic Policy does 
not expand on the special problems associated with individuals 
who have mental disabilities.60 Second, IRBs must ensure that, 
[w]hen some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to 
coercion or undue influence, such as . . . mentally disabled 
                                            
 51. Id. at 23,195. 
 52. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 
44,512, 44,512, 44,529 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 
164; 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56). 
 53. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101124 (2011). 
 54. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201207. 
 55. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301306. 
 56. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401409. 
 57. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101505 (lacking a Subpart for research involving adults 
with impaired decision-making capacity). 
 58. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3). 
 59. Id. 
 60. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101505 (failing to provide details on the special problems 
associated with individuals who have mental disabilities). 
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persons, . . . additional safeguards have been included in the 
study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.61 The 
Basic Policy does not identify the content of such additional 
safeguards.62 Third, [i]f an IRB regularly reviews research that 
involves a vulnerable category of subjects, such as . . . mentally 
disabled persons, consideration shall be given to the inclusion of 
one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and 
experienced in working with these subjects.63 The Basic Policy 
does not expand on the requirement for the inclusion of 
individuals who are knowledgeable about and experienced in 
working with individuals with mental disabilities.64 Finally, IRBs 
must ensure that informed consent to research participation has 
been obtained from each prospective subject or the subjects 
LAR,65 defined elsewhere in the Basic Policy as an individual or 
judicial or other body authorized under applicable law to consent 
on behalf of a prospective subject to the subjects participation in 
the procedure(s) involved in the research.66 The phrase 
                                            
 61. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b). 
 62. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101505 (neglecting to specify what the additional safeguards 
entail). 
 63. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a). Although the Basic Policy does not expand on this 
requirement, the National Institutes of Health recently explained that an IRB that 
regularly reviews research involving individuals with impaired decision-making capacity 
should consider including as members (i) professionals with the appropriate background, 
knowledge and experience in working with individuals with impaired [decision-making] 
capacity; (ii) representatives of [relevant] patient advocacy groups; (iii) experts in the 
assessment of consent capacity; and/or (iv) experts on the scientific and ethical issues 
relevant to studies involving vulnerable populations. Office of Extramural Research, 
Research Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to 
Consider, NATL INSTS. HEALTH (Nov. 2009), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/ 
questionablecapacity.htm. The Subcommittee for the Inclusion of Individuals with 
Impaired Decision Making in Research (SIIIDR) of the Secretarys Advisory Committee on 
Human Research Protections (SACHRP) within the Office for Human Research 
Protections (OHRP) similarly recommends that IRBs consider including as members 
(i) [p]atients, former patients, patient advocates or family members or others who can 
represent the views and perspectives of the research participants; (ii) [i]ndividuals  
with specific professional expertise related to the nature and consequences of  
impaired consent capacity in the study population; (iii) [o]ther individuals who  
can provide information relevant to the circumstances and context in which 
 the participant and LAR will be recruited (e.g., the long term care facility, critical  
care unit, or mental health center); and (iv) [i]ndividuals with expertise regarding 
applicable legal and regulatory requirements for consent to research by an LAR. SECYS 
ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THE INCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH IMPAIRED DECISION MAKING IN 
RESEARCH (SIIIDR) 67 (2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/ 
20090715letterattach.pdf. 
 64. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101505 (declining to elaborate on the inclusion of such 
individuals). 
 65. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(4), 46.116. 
 66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c) (emphasis added). 
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applicable law is generally thought to refer to state law67 
although, as discussed in more detail at Part II.B below, state 
law on this topic varies widely if it exists. 
In light of the Common Rules lack of specific guidance 
regarding research involving individuals with impaired decision-
making capacity, a national commission and federal agencies have 
issued nonbinding recommendations for the conduct of research 
involving individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.68 In 
December 1998, the Clinton Administrations National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC) issued a special report entitled 
Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders That May 
Affect Decisionmaking Capacity (Report).69 In the Report, the 
NBAC recommended allowing minimal risk research that would 
involve individuals with disorders that may affect decision-making 
capacity if one of the following three requirements has been 
satisfied: (i) the individual has the capacity to consent and does 
consent to research participation; or, if the individual does not have 
the capacity to consent, (ii) the individual executed an advance 
research directive stating the individuals desire to participate in 
the research and the individuals LAR consents to the individuals 
research participation; or (iii) the individuals LAR consents to the 
individuals research participation.70 The NBAC further 
recommended allowing greater than minimal risk research, but 
only if the research offered the prospect of direct medical benefit to 
the individual and, as in the case of minimal risk research, one of 
the three requirements listed in the preceding sentence has been 
satisfied.71 If the research protocol involved greater than minimal 
risk but did not offer the prospect of direct medical benefit to the 
individual, the NBAC would require either one of the first two 
requirements to be satisfied or would require a special standing 
panel with expertise on research involving individuals with mental 
disorders that may affect decision-making capacity to approve the 
individuals research participation.72 Working groups in 200173 and 
                                            
 67. See, e.g., Request for Information and Comments on Research that Involves 
Adult Individuals with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,966, 50,969 
(Sept. 5, 2007). 
 68. See infra text accompanying notes 6987. 
 69. See generally NATL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMN, RESEARCH INVOLVING 
PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY (1998). 
 70. Id. at 60 (Chapter 5, Recommendation 10). 
 71. Id. (Chapter 5, Recommendation 11). 
 72. Id. at 61 (Chapter 5, Recommendation 12). 
 73. HHS Working Grp. on the NBAC Report, Analysis and Proposed Actions 
Regarding the NBAC Report: Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders that May 
Affect Decisionmaking Capacity, U.S. DEPT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Jan. 16, 2001), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/nbac/a.shtml. 
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200274 responded to the NBACs Report with additional 
recommendations, including a proposal to adopt an additional 
category of research (minor increase over minimal risk), 
although neither the NBAC nor the working group 
recommendations were adopted by a federal agency in formal 
regulations.75 
On September 5, 2007, HHS published in the Federal 
Register a formal request for public comments addressing 
whether additional guidance or a new subpart of the Common 
Rule is needed to address research involving adults with 
impaired decision-making capacity.76 Although the closing date 
for the receipt of comments was January 14, 2008,77 HHS did not 
issue any proposed or final regulations subsequent to its request 
for comments. 
Due to the lack of formal federal regulation, several federal 
agencies and committees have released informal guidance 
regarding the conduct of human subjects research involving 
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.78 In 
November 2008, the Office for Human Research Protections 
(OHRP) posted on its website answers to certain frequently 
asked questions.79 The OHRPs answers do not provide clear 
guidance, especially for researchers involved in multi-site, multi-
state investigations. In response to one frequently asked question 
(Who can be a [LAR] for the purpose of providing consent on 
behalf of a prospective subject?), the OHRP explains that some 
state laws identify those persons who are eligible to serve as a 
LAR, while other state laws do not.80 According to the OHRP, 
IRBs may wish to consult with legal counsel when deciding who 
can serve as [a] LAR for subjects of proposed research.81 In 
response to a second frequently asked question (When may a 
[LAR] provide consent on behalf of an adult with diminished 
decision-making capacity?), the OHRP explains that the 
                                            
 74. NATL HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS ADVISORY COMM. (NHRPAC), REPORT 
FROM NHRPAC ON INFORMED CONSENT AND THE DECISIONALLY IMPAIRED 14 (2002), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nhrpac/documents/nhrpac10.pdf. 
 75. Tovino, supra note 8, at 40. 
 76. See Request for Information and Comments on Research that Involves Adult 
Individuals with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,966, 50,966, 50,968 
(Sept. 5, 2007). 
 77. Id. at 50,966. 
 78. See infra text accompanying notes 7987. 
 79. Office for Human Research Protections, Informed ConsentFAQs, U.S. DEPT 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://answers.hhs.gov/ohrp/categories/1566 (last visited Jan. 
1, 2013). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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Common Rule should be consulted in addition to the laws of the 
jurisdiction in which the research is conducted.82 
In addition to the OHRPs answers to frequently asked 
questions, the Subcommittee for the Inclusion of Individuals with 
Impaired Decision-Making in Research (SIIIDR) of the 
Secretarys Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections 
(SACHRP) of the OHRP approved at meetings held on March 27, 
2008, and March 4, 2009, recommendations regarding the 
inclusion of individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.83 
When state or local law does not identify the individuals who are 
eligible to serve as a surrogate, the SIIIDR recommended 
obtaining consent from a priority-ordered list of individuals, 
including 
(a) a person designated by the individual, while retaining 
the decisional capacity to do so, to make decisions for 
him/her regarding participation in research; 
(b) a person designated by the individual, while retaining 
the decisional capacity to do so, to make decisions for 
him/her regarding non-research health care decisions; 
(c) the individuals legal guardian with authority to make 
health care decisions for him or her; 
(d) the spouse, or if recognized by applicable law, the civil 
union partner or domestic partner; 
(e) an adult son or daughter; 
(f) a parent; 
(g) an adult brother or sister; [and] 
(h) an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for 
the prospective research participant.84 
In addition to the SIIIDRs recommendations, the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) released in November 2009 certain 
Points to Consider with respect to research involving 
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.85 In its 
Points to Consider, the NIH recognized that many states do 
not have laws specifically governing the consent-to-research 
process and noted that stakeholders frequently rely on laws 
governing consent to treatment.86 On this issue, the NIH 
concludes that IRBs may wish to consult with legal counsel 
                                            
 82. Id. 
 83. SECYS ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra note 63, at 1. 
 84. Id. at 14. 
 85. Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63. 
 86. Id. 
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when determining who can serve as [a] LAR for subjects of 
proposed research.87 
Most recently, HHS, on July 26, 2011, issued its ANPR 
request[ing] comment on how . . . regulations for protecting 
human subjects who participate in research might be modernized 
and revised to be more effective.88 Although the ANPR does not 
specifically focus on the issues raised by research involving 
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity, the ANPR 
does recognize that the landscape of research activities has 
changed dramatically since HHS adopted the Common Rule,89 
that there has been a proliferation of research in the areas of 
neurology, psychiatry, and the social and behavioral sciences,90 
and that new technologies, including functional magnetic 
resonance imaging, have been employed to assist in answering 
research questions.91 Given the rapid growth and expansion of 
human subjects research, the ANPR proposes changes to seven 
broad aspects of HHSs current regulatory framework92 and 
requests comment on seventy-four specific questions relating to 
the regulation of human subjects research.93 One set of proposed 
changes relates to [i]mprovement of consent forms and the 
consent process.94 More specifically, Question #36 asks, 
What additional information, if any, should be required by 
the regulations to assure that consent forms appropriately 
describe to subjects, in concise and clear language, 
alternatives to participating in the research study and why 
it may or may not be in their best interests to participate? 
What modifications or deletions to the required elements 
would be appropriate?95 
Question #38 further asks, Should the regulations require 
that, for certain types of studies, investigators assess how well 
potential research subjects comprehend the information provided 
to them before they are allowed to sign the consent form?96 
                                            
 87. Id. 
 88. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 
44,512, 44,512 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164; 21 
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56). 
 89. See id. at 44,513. 
 90. See id. at 44,51213. 
 91. See id. at 44,513. 
 92. See id. at 44,514 (listing seven broad sets of proposed changes). 
 93. See id. at 44,51729. 
 94. Id. at 44,514. 
 95. Id. at 44,523. 
 96. Id. 
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Finally, Question #40 asks, Would informed consent be 
improved if the regulations included additional requirements 
regarding the consent process, and if so, what should be 
required?97 
As of this writing, HHS has yet to issue proposed or final 
regulations in response to the comments received by HHS on the 
ANPR.98 As a result, the conduct of human subjects research 
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity remains 
legally and ethically murky, especially in the context of multi-
site, multi-state clinical trials.99 
B. State Law 
Although the federal government has yet to issue 
regulations governing research involving individuals with 
impaired decision-making capacity, some states do have relevant 
laws, although these laws vary widely in their application, scope, 
and regulation.100 Below, the laws of California, Missouri, and 
New Jersey are used to illustrate the variety of state approaches 
to the regulation of human subjects involving individuals with 
impaired decision-making capacity. 
California law is favorable for researchers who wish to 
conduct research involving individuals with impaired decision-
making capacity. California law allows a surrogate to consent to 
research on behalf of an individual who is unable to consent and 
does not express dissent or resistance to participation, even if 
the research does not pose the prospect of direct medical benefit, 
so long as the research relate[s] to the cognitive impairment, 
lack of capacity, or serious or life-threatening disease[ ] and 
                                            
 97. Id. 
 98. See Kristen Rosati, American Health Lawyers Association, The Tissue Issue: 
Recent Developments in Biospecimen Research, Legal Issues Affecting Academic Medical 
Centers and Other Teaching Institutions 5 (Jan. 26, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/AMC12/papers/G_r
osati.pdf); see also Office for Human Research Protection, ANPRM Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs) July 2011, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/anprmqanda.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2013) 
(asserting that the public will have an additional opportunity to comment before the 
Common Rule is changed). 
 99. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 12, at 797 (Despite a wave of initiatives in the 
late 1990s to clarify policy, surrogate consent for research continues to be a murky legal 
area and incapable subjects in the United States still lack clear regulatory protection.); 
SECYS ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra note 63, at 2. 
 100. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 12, at 798 (Previous reviews of state laws and 
regulations on proxy or surrogate consent for research have revealed tremendous 
heterogeneity . . . .); Saks et al., supra note 12, at 3779 (surveying state laws governing 
consent to research by legally authorized representatives on behalf of individuals with 
impaired decision-making capacity). 
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condition[ ] of the individual.101 Under California law, the 
surrogate shall have reasonable knowledge of the subject and 
shall be selected from the following priority-ordered list of 
persons: 
(1) The [individuals] agent pursuant to an advance health 
care directive. 
(2) The conservator or guardian of the person having the 
authority to make health care decisions for the individual. 
(3) The spouse of the [individual]. 
(4) [A domestic partner]. 
(5) An adult son or daughter of the person. 
(6) A custodial parent of the person. 
(7) Any adult brother or sister of the person. 
(8) Any adult grandchild of the person. 
(9) An available adult relative with the closest degree of 
kinship to the person.102 
California research surrogates are required to base research 
participation decisions on the [individuals] . . . health care 
instructions, if any, and other wishes, to the extent known by 
the surrogate.103 Otherwise, the surrogate . . . shall make the 
decision in accordance with the [individuals] best interests.104 In 
determining the [individuals] best interests, the [surrogate] shall 
consider the [individuals] personal values and his or her best 
estimation of what the [individual] would have chosen if he or 
she were capable of making a decision regarding research 
participation.105 California law prohibits surrogates from 
receiving compensation in exchange for consenting to an 
individuals research participation.106 
Missouri law is much less descriptive (and permissive) than 
California law. Missouri law prohibits certain public and private 
mental health facilities and programs from conducting research 
involving certain individuals with intellectual disabilities, 
developmental disabilities, mental illness, mental disorders or 
alcohol or drug abuse unless such research is intended to 
alleviate or prevent the disabling conditions or is reasonably 
                                            
 101. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(b)(c) (West 2006). 
 102. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(c)(1)(9) (West 2006). 
 103. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(g) (West 2006). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(i) (West 2006). 
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expected to be of direct therapeutic benefit to the participants.107 
Missouri law does not address whether a surrogate may consent 
to research on behalf of an individual with impaired decision-
making capacity.108 
New Jersey law requires research involving individuals with 
cognitive impairments, lack of capacity, or serious physical or 
behavioral conditions and life-threatening diseases to either 
(i) offer the prospect of direct benefit to the person and maintain 
an appropriate balance of research benefits and risks; or (ii) be 
likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the [persons] 
disorder or condition; not be, by its nature, able to be conducted 
without the participation of persons with impaired decision-
making capacity; and involve[ ] no more than a minor increase 
over minimal risk.109 A New Jersey research protocol that meets 
one of these two sets of requirements may proceed if consent is 
obtained from the individual or a surrogate,110 defined as 
an authorized representative with reasonable knowledge of 
the subject, who shall include any of the following persons, in the 
following descending order of priority: 
(1) the guardian of the subject who has the authority to 
make health care decisions for the subject; 
(2) the health care representative of the subject pursuant to 
an advance directive for health care; 
(3) the spouse or civil union partner, as applicable, of the 
subject; 
(4) the domestic partner . . . of the subject; 
(5) an adult son or daughter of the subject; 
(6) a custodial parent of the subject; 
(7) an adult brother or sister of the subject; 
(8) an adult grandchild of the subject; 
(9) an available adult relative with the closest degree of 
kinship to the subject.111 
Many states do not have laws governing the conduct of 
human subjects research involving adults with impaired 
decision-making capacity.112 In states that lack research-specific 
                                            
 107. MO. ANN. STAT. § 630.192 (West Supp. 2012). 
 108. See Susan E. Hickman et al., The POLST (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining 
Treatment) Paradigm to Improve End-of-Life Care: Potential State Legal Barriers to 
Implementation, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 119, 126, 128, 133 (2008). 
 109. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:143(a)(b) (West Supp. 2012). 
 110. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:144(a) (West Supp. 2012). 
 111. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:145(a)(1)(9) (West Supp. 2012). 
 112. See, e.g., SECYS ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra 
Do Not Delete  2/18/2013 4:08 PM 
810 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [50:3 
laws, some researchers and research institutions rely on state 
laws that govern consent to treatment, including laws like the 
Texas, New York, and Washington laws discussed at Part III.B, 
below.113 Moreover, it is the current policy of the OHRP to permit 
a surrogate to consent to research if the surrogate is authorized 
under state law to consent to the procedures involved in the 
research under state laws governing consent to treatment.114 In 
addition, the SIIIDR currently recommends, in the absence of a 
specific law governing consent to research, that a surrogate who 
is designated to make nonresearch health care decisions be 
ranked second in the priority-ordered list of persons who are 
eligible to make research participation decisions.115 In summary, 
some researchers, some research institutions, the OHRP, the 
SIIIDR, and other stakeholders believe that a surrogate who is 
authorized to consent to treatment also should be permitted to 
consent to an individuals research participation.116 Part III, next, 
examines federal and state legislation governing consent to 
treatment. Then, Part IV argues that legislation governing 
consent to treatment should not be used to answer research-
related questions. 
III. CONSENT-TO-TREATMENT LEGISLATION 
In the clinical context, decision-making capacity refers to a 
patients cognitive and emotional capacity to consider 
information relating to the risks and benefits of a proposed 
diagnostic examination, medical treatment, or surgical 
procedure; the ability to make a decision to consent or refuse to 
consent to such examination, treatment, or procedure; and the 
                                            
note 63, at 2 (Very few states specifically define legally authorized representatives 
(LARs) for research, and most states laws are silent on the topic. Virtually no state laws 
address the many ethical issues that arise when LARs are involved in research decision-
making, leaving it to IRBs and institutions to invent solutions.). 
 113. See, e.g., Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63 (In most jurisdictions, 
LAR appointment processes are not specific to the research setting and institutions rely 
on the laws governing the use of LARs for clinical care.). 
 114. See, e.g., SECYS ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, 
supra note 63, at 13 (explaining, at Recommendation 8(b), that [i]n states with laws 
or regulations that address consent to treatment but do not specifically consider 
consent to research, current OHRP interpretation permits consent to research by 
individuals authorized under laws that allow consent to the procedures involved in 
the research). 
 115. Id. (recommending, at Recommendation 9(a)(ii)(b), in the absence of applicable state 
law, that a person who is designated to make nonresearch health care decisions be ranked 
second in the priority-ordered list of persons who are eligible to make research participation 
decisions). 
 116. See id. at 1314. 
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ability to communicate that decision.117 Neurologists, 
psychiatrists, geriatricians, and emergency medicine physicians, 
among other clinicians, frequently treat patients with impaired 
decision-making capacity.118 Some of these patients may be in a 
coma or vegetative state and have no present decision-making 
capacity.119 Other patients may have mild, moderate, or severe 
neurological disorders, including Parkinsons disease, 
Alzheimers disease, and related dementias, which may restrict 
their decision-making capacity.120 Still other patients may have 
                                            
 117. See, e.g., Gregory L. Larkin, Catherine A. Marco & Jean T. Abbott, Emergency 
Determination of Decision-Making Capacity: Balancing Autonomy and Beneficence in the 
Emergency Department, 8 ACADEMIC EMERGENCY MED. 282, 282 (2001) (Decision-making 
capacity includes the ability to receive, process, and understand information, the ability to 
deliberate, the ability to make choices, and the ability to communicate those 
preferences.); Roy C. Martin et al., Medical Decision-Making Capacity in Cognitively 
Impaired Parkinsons Disease Patients Without Dementia, 23 MOVEMENT DISORDERS 
1867, 1867 (2008) (defining medical decision-making capacity as the cognitive and 
emotional capacity to accept a proposed treatment, to refuse treatment, or to select among 
treatment alternatives). 
 118. See, e.g., Grant V. Chow et al., CURVES: A Mnemonic for Determining Medical 
Decision-Making Capacity and Providing Emergency Treatment in the Acute Setting, 137 
CHEST 421, 42127 (2010) (addressing the evaluation of decision-making capacity in the 
emergency context); Paul J. Eslinger, Neurological and Neuropsychological Bases of 
Empathy, 39 EUR. NEURO. 193, 198 (1998) (remarking that neurologists and 
neuropsychologists address a variety of issues, including cognitive impairment); Edmund 
Howe, Ethical Aspects of Evaluating a Patients Mental Capacity, PSYCHIATRY, Jul. 2009, 
at 15, 15 (noting that nonpsychiatrist physicians frequently consult with psychiatrists to 
help make determinations regarding patients decision-making capacity); James M. Lai & 
Jason Karlawish, Assessing the Capacity to Make Everyday Decisions: A Guide for 
Clinicians and an Agenda for Future Research, 15 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 101, 101 
(2007) (noting that [c]ompetency assessments are a common and necessary part of caring 
for older patients with cognitive impairment[s] and that geriatricians face considerable 
challenges in accurately and reliably identifying impaired competency); id. at 103 
([D]ischarge planners, case managers, and clinicians in hospitals, skilled nursing 
facilities, and emergency departments [frequently] must decide whether a patient with 
functional impairments is capable of making decisions.). 
 119. See, e.g., Rowan H. Harwood, Robert Stewart & Peter Bartlett, Safeguarding the 
Rights of Patients Who Lack Capacity in General Hospitals. Do the Bournewood Proposals 
for England and Wales Help or Hinder?, 36 AGE & AGEING 120, 120 (2007) (Many 
people . . . in coma[s] are admitted to hospital[s], but lack the capacity to consent to 
admission.); Sheila A. M. McLean, Permanent Vegetative State and the Law, 71 J. 
NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY (NEUROLOGY IN PRACTICE SUPPLEMENT 1) 
i26, i26 (2001) (noting that patients in a vegetative state lack capacity to consent to 
treatment). 
 120. See, e.g., Jason Karlawish, Measuring Decision-Making Capacity in Cognitively 
Impaired Individuals, 16 NEUROSIGNALS 91, 9198 (2008) (reviewing studies of the 
capacity to consent to treatment and research in the context of Alzheimers disease and 
related dementias; and noting that individuals with Alzheimers disease and related 
dementias frequently experience losses in decision-making capacity); Martin et al., supra 
note 117, at 186774 (assessing decision-making capacity in patients with Parkinsons 
disease (PD) compared to healthy older adults; and suggesting that impairment in 
decision-making capacity is already present in cognitively impaired PD patients without 
dementia and that such impairment increases as these patients develop dementia); 
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severe mental illnesses (such as schizophrenia with disturbance 
of thought and perception) that limit their decision-making 
capacity.121 Other patients may be experiencing a temporary loss 
of decision-making capacity due to alcohol or drug intoxication or 
mild traumatic brain injury, although they may be expected to 
fully regain their decision-making capacity in the very near 
future.122 As these examples show, an individuals decision-
making capacity is not always conclusively present or absent but 
occurs along a continuum that depends on the nature and 
severity of the patients physical and mental health conditions 
and the timing of the patients symptom occurrence.123 
Neurological, psychiatric, and other health conditions do not 
invariably impair an individuals decision-making capacity, and 
patient-specific assessments always are necessary.124 
                                            
Jennifer Moye et al., Neuropsychological Predictors of Decision-Making Capacity Over 9 
Months in Mild-to-Moderate Dementia, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 78, 7883 (2006) 
(examining rates and neuropsychological predictors of decision-making capacity among 
older adults with dementia; and finding that [s]ome patients with mild-to-moderate 
dementia develop clinically relevant impairment[s] of [decision-making] capacity within a 
year). 
 121. See, e.g., Delphine Capdevielle et al., Competence to Consent and Insight in 
Schizophrenia: Is There an Association? A Pilot Study, 108 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 272, 272
73 (2009) (Data from studies of treatment decision processes by schizophrenic patients 
have suggested that, as a group, these patients perform significantly worse on many 
measures in comparison to those suffering from depression, other medical illnesses (such 
as heart disease, HIV infection) or healthy control subjects.); John H. Coverdale, 
Laurence B. McCullough & Frank A. Chervenak, Assisted and Surrogate Decision Making 
for Pregnant Patients Who Have Schizophrenia, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 659, 659 (2004) 
(explaining that [s]chizophrenia can chronically and variably impair a womans decisions 
concerning the management of [her] pregnancy, including decisions regarding pregnancy 
continuation). 
 122. See, e.g., Larkin, Marco & Abbott, supra note 117, at 28384 (noting that 
patients who are intoxicated present challenges in the context of determining decision-
making capacity); Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63 (For individuals with 
conditions that bring about fluctuating levels of consent capacity, it is important to 
consider the timing of the assessment and consent; it may make sense to time the initial 
consent carefully to avoid periods when prospective subjects may be experiencing 
heightened impairments, e.g., an individual with . . . acute drug intoxication.); K.L. 
Triebel et al., Treatment Consent Capacity in Patients with Traumatic Brain Injury 
Across a Range of Injury Severity, 78 NEUROLOGY 1472, 1475 (2012). 
 123. Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that decision-making 
capacity for individuals with disabilities occurs along a continuum); Larkin, Marco & 
Abbott, supra note 117, at 282 ([Decision-making capacity] is a dynamic . . . and 
changing talent; in practice it may be assessed on a non-dichotomous spectrum of 
capacity, pertaining to the particular health care decisions at hand. Often, impairment is 
situational; the same patient may be competent for one decision and not another, 
depending on the gravity and consequences of the decision and the potential for harm.). 
 124. See, e.g., Capdevielle et al., supra note 121, at 273 (explaining that a subgroup 
of patients with schizophrenia, even when acutely ill, performs no worse than the general 
population on measures of treatment decision processes (citations omitted)); The 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Executive Summary, MACARTHUR RES. 
NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & L. (May 2004), http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/ 
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A. Federal Law 
Other than general references to the doctrine of informed 
consent to treatment and state law provisions regarding legal 
representatives, federal law does not specifically address 
impaired clinical decision-making capacity, first-person consent 
to treatment, or surrogate consent to treatment.125 For example, 
federal regulations that establish requirements applicable to 
Medicare-participating hospitals simply provide,  
The patient or his or her representative (as allowed under 
State law) has the right to make informed decisions 
regarding his or her care. The patients rights include being 
informed of his or her health status, being involved in care 
planning and treatment, and being able to request or refuse 
treatment.126  
Federal regulations governing Medicare-participating hospices, 
which provide palliative care to patients with terminal 
conditions, similarly give hospice patients a general right to be 
involved in developing their own hospice plans of care as well as 
the right to refuse unwanted care.127 If a hospice patient has been 
adjudged incompetent under state law by a court of proper 
jurisdiction, federal regulations generally provide that the rights 
of the [hospice] patient are to be exercised by the person 
appointed pursuant to state law to act on the patients behalf.128 
If a state court has not adjudged a [hospice] patient 
incompetent, [federal law provides that] any legal representative 
designated by the patient in accordance with state law may 
exercise the patients rights to the extent allowed by state law.129 
Federal regulations governing Medicare-participating nursing 
homes also are general in nature: Unless adjudged incompetent 
or otherwise found to be incapacitated under the laws of the 
State, [patients have the right to] participate in planning care 
and treatment or changes in care and treatment.130 
                                            
treatment.html (Most patients hospitalized with serious mental illness have abilities 
similar to persons without mental illness for making treatment decisions. Taken by itself, 
mental illness does not invariably impair decision-making capacities. On the other hand, 
a substantial percentage of hospitalized patientsup to half in the group with 
schizophrenia when all four types of abilities are consideredshow high levels of 
impairment. (emphasis omitted)). 
 125. See Saks et al., supra note 12, at 40, 52, 5960. 
 126. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b)(2) (2010). 
 127. 42 C.F.R. § 418.52(c)(2)(3). 
 128. 42 C.F.R. § 418.52(b)(2). 
 129. 42 C.F.R. § 418.52(b)(3). 
 130. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(d)(3). 
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B. State Law 
Unlike federal law, almost every state has enacted a law 
that specifically defines decision-making capacity and incapacity, 
establishes the process for obtaining the informed consent of 
patients with capacity, establishes the process for obtaining 
surrogate consent in the event a patient lacks capacity, identifies 
the persons in priority order who are eligible to serve as a 
surrogate for health care decisions, and identifies the standard 
that a surrogate should use in deciding whether to consent to 
medical treatment on behalf of a patient.131 Illustrative laws from 
Texas, New York, and Washington are examined below. Although 
these state laws vary in some important respects, they establish 
relatively uniform consent-to-treatment policies and procedures 
and may be used to illustrate the general approach that most 
state legislatures have taken with respect to health care 
decisions that involve individuals with impaired decision-making 
capacity. 
The Texas Consent to Medical Treatment Act (Texas Act)132 
defines decision-making capacity as the ability to understand 
and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision 
regarding medical treatment and the ability to reach an informed 
decision in the matter133 and incapacity as lacking the ability, 
based on reasonable medical judgment, to understand and 
appreciate the nature and consequences of a treatment decision, 
including the significant benefits and harms of and reasonable 
alternatives to any proposed treatment decision.134 A patient 
with decision-making capacity has the right to consent or refuse 
to consent to recommended medical treatments and surgical 
procedures.135 If a patient is comatose, incapacitated, or 
otherwise mentally or physically incapable of communication 
and does not have an advance directive, then a competent adult 
surrogate from a priority-ordered list who has decision-making 
capacity, [who] is available after a reasonably diligent inquiry, 
and [who] is willing to consent to medical treatment on behalf of 
the patient may consent to medical treatment on behalf of the 
                                            
 131. See infra text accompanying notes 132172.  
 132. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.001 (West 2010). 
 133. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(3) (West 2010). 
 134. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(5) (West 2010). 
 135. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 601.4(a)(1) (2012) (Tex. Med. Disclosure Panel, Informed 
Consent) (codifying Texass standard disclosure and consent form, which contains the 
following header: You have the right, as a patient, to be informed about your condition 
and the recommended surgical, medical, or diagnostic procedure to be used so that you 
may make the decision whether or not to undergo the procedure after knowing the risks 
and hazards involved (emphasis omitted)). 
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patient.136 The following individuals may serve as a surrogate, 
but only if an individual in a previous class is not available after 
a reasonably diligent inquiry: 
(1) the patients spouse; 
(2) an adult child of the patient who has the waiver and 
consent of all other qualified adult children of the patient to 
act as the sole decision-maker; 
(3) a majority of the patients reasonably available adult 
children; 
(4) the patients parents; or 
(5) the individual clearly identified to act for the patient by 
the patient before the patient became incapacitated, the 
patients nearest living relative, or a member of the 
clergy.137 
Any dispute as to the right of a party to act as a surrogate 
decision-maker must be resolved only by a court of record having 
jurisdiction.138 Any medical treatment consented to [by a 
surrogate] must be based on knowledge of what the patient 
would desire, if known.139 The Texas Act concludes by 
prohibiting surrogates from consenting to certain health care 
services and treatments, including voluntary inpatient mental 
health services and electroconvulsive treatment.140 
The New York Family Health Care Decision Act (New York 
Act) defines decision-making capacity as the ability to 
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of 
proposed health care, including the benefits and risks of and 
alternatives to proposed health care, and to reach an informed 
decision.141 A patient with decision-making capacity has the 
right to consent or refuse to consent to recommended medical 
treatments and surgical procedures.142 If a patient is determined 
                                            
 136. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 313.003(a), 313.004(a) (West Supp. 2012). 
 137. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(a)(1)(5) (West 2010). 
 138. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(b) (West 2010). 
 139. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(c) (West 2010). 
 140. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(d)(1)(2) (West 2010). 
 141. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994a(5) (McKinney 2012). 
 142. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1) (McKinney 2012) (Any person who is eighteen 
years of age or older . . . may give effective consent for medical, dental, health and 
hospital services for himself or herself, and the consent of no other person shall be 
necessary.); see also Schloendorff v. Socy of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) 
(Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall 
be done with his own body.), abrogated on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 
(N.Y. 1957); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981) (In this State . . . there is no 
statute which prohibits a patient from declining necessary medical treatment or a doctor 
from honoring the patients decision. To the extent that existing statutory and decisional 
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to lack decision-making capacity, a surrogate has the right to 
consent or refuse to consent to recommended medical treatments 
and surgical procedures on behalf of the patient.143 The following 
individuals in the following priority order are eligible to serve as 
a surrogate if an individual in a higher class is not reasonably 
available, willing, and competent to act: 
(a) A guardian authorized to [make health care decisions]; 
(b) The spouse, if not legally separated from the patient, or 
the domestic partner; 
(c) A son or daughter eighteen years of age or older; 
(d) A parent; 
(e) A brother or sister eighteen years of age or older; 
(f) A close friend.144 
The standard for surrogate decision-making in New York is 
patients wishes if known followed by the patients best 
interests.145 More specifically, a surrogate shall make health care 
decisions: (i) in accordance with the patients wishes, including the 
patients religious and moral beliefs; or (ii) if the patients wishes 
are not reasonably known and cannot with reasonable diligence be 
ascertained, in accordance with the patients best interests.146 
Factors to be considered by the surrogate in assessing the patients 
best interests, if the patients wishes are not known, include  
the dignity and uniqueness of every person; the possibility 
and extent of preserving the patients life; the preservation, 
improvement or restoration of the patients health or 
functioning; the relief of the patients suffering; and any 
medical condition and such other concerns and values as a 
reasonable person in the patients circumstances would 
wish to consider.147 
Unlike the Texas Act, the New York Act establishes a 
procedure that is designed to secure a treatment decision in cases 
                                            
law manifests the States interest on this subject, they consistently support the right of 
the competent adult to make his own decision by imposing civil liability on those who 
perform medical treatment without consent, although the treatment may be beneficial or 
even necessary to preserve the patients life.), superseded by statute, Surrogates Court 
Procedure Act, N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAWS § 1750-b (McKinney 2011), as recognized 
in In re M.B., 846 N.E.2d 794, 79597 (N.Y. 2006) (granting a guardian full medical 
decision-making power); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 8082 (N.Y. 1990) (The 
common law of this State established the right of a competent adult to determine the 
course of his or her own medical treatment.). 
 143. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994d(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 2012). 
 144. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994d(1)(a) to (f) (McKinney 2012). 
 145. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994d(4)(a) (McKinney 2012). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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involving patients who lack capacity and have no family 
members or friends who are eligible to serve as a surrogate.148 
The specific procedures to be followed depend on whether the 
decision involves routine medical treatment [or] major medical 
treatment and the type of facility in which the treatment is to be 
provided.149 If a hospital is unable to identify an individual who is 
eligible to serve as a surrogate for a patient who lacks decision-
making capacity, the hospital [itself] shall identify, to the extent 
reasonably possible, the patients wishes and preferences, 
including the patients religious and moral beliefs, about pending 
health care decisions.150 In so doing, the hospital shall not be 
influenced by its own financial interests or the financial interests 
of any affiliated physician or other health care provider.151 With 
respect to routine medical treatments, including the 
administration of medications, the extraction of bodily fluids for 
analysis, and dental care performed with a local anesthetic, the 
New York Act authorizes the patients attending physician to 
consent to such treatments if the physician believes the 
treatments are in accordance with the patients wishes or, if the 
patients wishes are unknown, the treatments are in the patients 
best interests.152 With respect to major medical treatments 
(including any procedures involving general anesthesia, 
significant invasions of bodily integrity requiring an incision or 
other significant invasions of bodily integrity, the use of physical 
restraints, or the use of psychoactive medications), the New York 
Act permits the attending physician to make a recommendation 
for such treatments after consulting with hospital staff directly 
responsible for the patients care.153 If one other physician 
designated by the hospital or the patients residential care 
facility independently determines that a major medical 
treatment is appropriate, the treatment may be carried out at the 
hospital.154 
Unlike the Texas Act, the New York Act also requires notice 
of the patients lack of capacity and of the surrogates 
appointment to be given to certain parties, including 
(a) the patient, where there is any indication of the 
patients ability to comprehend the information; (b) to at 
                                            
 148. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994g (McKinney 2012). 
 149. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994g(2)(b) (McKinney 2012). 
 150. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994g(1) (McKinney 2012). 
 151. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994g(2)(b) (McKinney 2012). 
 152. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2994d(4), 2994g(2)(b), (3)(a)(b) (McKinney 2012). 
 153. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994g(4)(a) to (b)(i) (McKinney 2012). 
 154. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994g(4)(b)(ii) to (iii) (McKinney 2012). 
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least one person on the surrogate list highest in order of 
priority when persons in prior classes are not reasonably 
available; [and] (c) if the patient was transferred [to the 
hospital] from a mental hygiene facility, to the director of 
the mental hygiene facility and to [its legal services 
provider].155 
The New York Act also clarifies that, regardless of the 
patients lack of decision-making capacity, the patients present 
expressed wishes almost always govern.156 If a patient objects to 
the determination of incapacity, the choice of surrogate, or to a 
particular health care decision, for example, the patients 
objection or decision prevails unless  
(a) a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that 
the patient lacks decision-making capacity or the patient is 
or has been adjudged incompetent for all purposes and, in 
the case of a patients objection to treatment, makes any 
other finding required by law to authorize the treatment, or 
(b) another legal basis exists for overriding the patients 
decision.157 
The New York Act strictly regulates the process pursuant to 
which a patient is determined to lack decision-making capacity.158 
In general, an attending physician is required to make an initial 
determination that [the] . . . patient lacks decision-making 
capacity to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.159 The 
attending physicians initial determination shall include an 
assessment of the cause and extent of the patients incapacity 
and the likelihood that the patient will regain decision-making 
capacity.160 If the attending physician has determined that a 
patient lacks decision-making capacity due to mental illness, 
then either (i) the attending physician must be licensed to 
practice medicine in New York and must be board-certified (or 
eligible for board certification) by the American Board of 
Psychiatry and Neurology or the American Osteopathic Board of 
Neurology and Psychiatry; or (ii) a second physician who meets 
the requirements in the previous clause must also independently 
determine that the patient lacks decision-making capacity.161 If 
the attending physician has determined that a patient lacks 
decision-making capacity due to an intellectual or developmental 
                                            
 155. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(4)(a) to (c) (McKinney 2012). 
 156. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(6) (McKinney 2012). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(2) to (3) (McKinney 2012). 
 159. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(2) (McKinney 2012). 
 160. Id. 
 161. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(3)(c)(i) (McKinney 2012). 
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disability, then either (i) the attending physician must be 
employed by one of a number of state schools for individuals with 
developmental disabilities, or the physician must have been 
employed for a minimum of two years to render care and service 
in a facility operated or licensed by the [New York State Office 
for People With Developmental Disabilities], or the physician 
must have been approved by the commissioner of mental 
retardation and developmental disabilities in accordance with 
[certain] regulations [that require] . . . specialized training or 
three years experience in treating developmental disabilities; or 
(ii) another physician or clinical psychologist who meets the 
requirements in the previous clause also must independently 
determine that the patient lacks decision-making capacity.162 
In two situations, the attending physicians initial 
determination must be subject to an independently made 
concurring determination.163 The first situation involves a patient 
who is receiving care in a residential health care facility, in 
which case a health or social services practitioner employed by 
or otherwise formally affiliated with the facility must 
independently determine whether [the] patient lacks decision-
making capacity.164 The second situation involves a patient who 
is receiving care in a general hospital and with respect to whom a 
surrogate is requesting the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, in which case a health or social services 
practitioner employed by or otherwise formally affiliated with the 
facility must also independently determine whether [the] patient 
lacks decision-making capacity.165 If the health or social services 
practitioner consulted disagrees with the attending physicians 
determination, the matter shall be referred to [an] ethics review 
committee if it cannot otherwise be resolved.166 
Washington States surrogate consent-to-treatment 
procedures are considerably less detailed than those established 
in New York. Washingtons informed consent law (Washington 
Act) classifies an individual as incompetent for purposes of giving 
informed consent for health care if the individual is incompetent 
by reason of mental illness, developmental disability, senility, 
habitual drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, or other mental 
incapacity, of either managing his or her property or caring for 
                                            
 162. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(3)(c)(ii) (McKinney 2012). 
 163. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(3)(a) to (b) (McKinney 2012). 
 164. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(3)(b)(i) (McKinney 2012). 
 165. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(3)(b)(ii) (McKinney 2012). 
 166. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994c(3)(d) (McKinney 2012). 
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himself or herself, or both.167 A competent adult patient has the 
right to consent or refuse to consent to recommended medical 
treatments and surgical procedures.168 In situations involving an 
incompetent adult patient, consent may be obtained from an 
individual who is eligible to serve as a surrogate, according to the 
following priority-ordered list: 
(i) The appointed guardian of the patient, if any; 
(ii) The individual, if any, to whom the patient has given a 
durable power of attorney that encompasses the authority 
to make health care decisions; 
(iii) The patients spouse; 
(iv) Children of the patient who are at least eighteen years 
of age; 
(v) Parents of the patient; and 
(vi) Adult brothers and sisters of the patient.169 
If the health care provider seeking informed consent from a 
surrogate makes reasonable efforts to locate and secure 
authorization from a [surrogate] in the first or succeeding class 
and finds no such person available, authorization may be given 
by any [surrogate] in the next class in the order of descending 
priority.170 Before consenting to proposed health care on behalf of 
a patient, the Washington Act requires the surrogate to 
determine in good faith that the patient, if competent, would 
have consented to the proposed health care.171 If such a 
determination cannot be made, the decision to consent to the 
proposed health care may be made only after determining that 
the proposed health care is in the patients best interests.172 
IV.  CONSENT-TO-TREATMENT LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE 
USED TO ANSWER CONSENT-TO-RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Texas, New York, and Washington Acts vary in some 
important respects. The Acts use slightly different terminology 
(i.e., decision-making capacity and incapacity in Texas, 
decision-making capacity in New York, and incompetency in 
Washington), for example. The Acts also define these terms 
differently (i.e., the ability to understand and appreciate the 
                                            
 167. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.010(1)(e) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
 168. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.050(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
 169. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1)(a)(i)(vi) (West Supp. 2012). 
 170. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1)(b) (West Supp. 2012). 
 171. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1)(c) (West Supp. 2012). 
 172. Id. 
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nature and consequences of a health care decision in Texas and 
New York and mental illness, developmental disability, senility, 
habitual drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, or other mental 
incapacity in Washington), and prioritize differently the 
individuals who are eligible to serve as a surrogate (i.e., Texas 
prioritizes traditional opposite-sex spouses whereas New York 
and Washington place domestic partners on an equal footing with 
spouses). The Texas Act provides only one standard for surrogate 
decision-making, that is, what the patient would have desired, if 
known. In New York and Washington, the patients best interests 
may be used as a standard if the patients wishes are unknown. 
The New York Act stringently regulates all aspects of the 
surrogate consent-to-treatment process, including the credentials 
and experience of the attending physician who makes the initial 
determination that the patient lacks decision-making capacity, 
the procedure by which a second health care provider makes an 
independent concurring determination, the factors to be 
considered in assessing whether a particular treatment is in a 
patients best interests (if the patients wishes are unknown), and 
the situations in which a physician is authorized to make a minor 
or major medical treatment decision on behalf of a patient when 
the patient lacks decision-making capacity and a legally 
authorized surrogate does not exist. Texas and Washington, on 
the other hand, very generally and without much detail regulate 
the surrogate consent-to-treatment process. 
From a birds eye view, however, all three state laws take 
the same general approach to informed consent to treatment and 
surrogate health care decision-making. That is, all three state 
laws provide that (i) competent adult patients have the right to 
consent or refuse to consent to recommended medical treatments 
and surgical procedures; (ii) a surrogate may consent to 
treatment on behalf of an incapacitated or incompetent adult 
patient; (iii) the surrogate shall be selected from a priority list of 
reasonably available competent adults; and (iv) the surrogate 
shall consent to health care that the patient would have desired, 
if that desire is known. 
As discussed above, many states do not have laws governing 
the conduct of human subjects research involving adults with 
impaired decision-making capacity.173 In the absence of research-
                                            
 173. See, e.g., SECYS ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra 
note 63 (Very few states specifically define legally authorized representatives (LARs) for 
research, and most states laws are silent on the topic. Virtually no state laws address the 
many ethical issues that arise when LARs are involved in research decision-making, 
leaving it to IRBs and institutions to invent solutions.). 
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specific state laws, some researchers and research institutions 
rely on state laws that were designed for the treatment setting, 
and such reliance is supported by the OHRP.174 Contrary to this 
position, I argue that (i) legislation governing consent to 
treatment should not be used to answer research-related 
questions; and (ii) HHS should adopt regulations specifically 
governing human subjects research involving individuals with 
impaired decision-making capacity that should be used to answer 
all research-related questions. The reasons supporting these 
arguments are set forth below. 
First, treatment and research are intrinsically different 
activities. Treatment may be defined as the provision, 
coordination, or management of health care and related services 
by one or more health care providers to a particular individual.175 
The definition of treatment is based on the concept of health care, 
which has been defined as care, services, or procedures related to 
the health of a particular individual.176 Health care is frequently 
defined to include [p]reventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, 
rehabilitative, maintenance, or palliative care that is provided to 
a particular individual, as well as counseling, assessments, and 
procedures that relate to the physical or mental condition or 
functional status of a particular individual.177 Activities thus are 
classified as treatment when they involve a health care service 
provided by a health care provider that is tailored to the specific 
preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, or other health care needs of 
a particular individual.178 
                                            
 174. See, e.g., Office of Extramural Research, supra note 63 (In most 
jurisdictions, LAR appointment processes are not specific to the research setting and 
institutions rely on the laws governing the use of LARs for clinical care.); SECYS 
ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra note 63 (explaining, at 
Recommendation 8(b), that [i]n states with laws or regulations that address consent 
to treatment but do not specifically consider consent to research, current OHRP 
interpretation permits consent to research by individuals authorized under laws that 
allow consent to the procedures involved in the research; and recommending, at 
Recommendation 9(a)(ii)(b), in the absence of applicable state law, that a person who 
is designated to make nonresearch health care decisions be ranked second in the 
priority-ordered list of persons who are eligible to make research participation 
decisions). 
 175. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2011) (definition of treatment set forth in the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule). 
 176. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of health care set forth in the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule). 
 177. See, e.g., id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(10) (West Supp. 2012). 
 178. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 
65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,626 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (The 
activities described by treatment, therefore, all involve health care providers supplying 
health care to a particular patient. While many activities beneficial to patients are offered 
to entire populations or involve examining health information about entire populations, 
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Research, on the other hand, is defined as a systematic 
investigation, including research development, testing and 
evaluation, [that is] designed to develop or contribute to 
generalizable knowledge.179 Knowledge is considered 
generalizable when it can be applied to either a population 
inside or outside of the population served by the [institution 
conducting the research].180 The purpose of research, then, is to 
collect data that will lead to the creation of generalizable 
knowledge that may result in the production of new therapies or 
the improvement of existing therapies.181 
Compared side by side, the differences between treatment 
and research become clear. First, the primary purpose of 
treatment is to maintain or improve a particular patients health, 
whereas the primary purpose of research is to gain knowledge 
that will result in the creation of new treatments for future 
patients.182 Second, physicians providing treatment frequently 
adjust, substitute, and change therapies to meet the specific 
health needs of particular patients.183 Investigators conducting 
research, however, must follow approved research protocols and 
are not permitted to adjust, substitute, or change the 
experimental intervention (other than to allow the research 
                                            
treatment involves health services provided by a health care provider and tailored to the 
specific needs of an individual patient.). 
 179. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2011) (definition of research set forth in the 
federal Common Rule); id. § 164.501 (definition of research set forth in the federal HIPAA 
Privacy Rule). 
 180. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 
65 Fed. Reg. at 82,625; Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.005, 46.006 (2011). 
 181. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, The Ubiquity and Utility of the Therapeutic 
Misconception, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POLY, no. 2, at 271, 272 (2002) (Although some research 
participants may receive a health benefit, research is designed to generate data that could 
lead to improved care for future patients.); id. at 285 ([I]nvestigators in the research 
setting focus primarily on the need to obtain valid scientific data.); Gail E. Henderson et 
al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic Misconception, 4 PLOS 
MED. 1735, 1737 (2007) ([T]here is consensus that the defining characteristic of research 
is to create generalizable knowledge through answering a scientific question.); id. at 1737 
box 2 (Clinical research is designed to produce generalizable knowledge and to answer 
questions about the safety and efficacy of intervention(s) under study in order to 
determine whether or not they may be useful for the care of future patients.). 
 182. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 285 ([P]hysicians in the medical setting 
seek solely to benefit the patient. In contrast, investigators in the research setting focus 
primarily on the need to obtain valid scientific data.); Belmont Report: Ethical Principles 
and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 
23,193 (Apr. 18, 1979) (distinguishing clinical practice from biomedical and behavioral 
research). 
 183. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 272 (After treatment begins, medication 
dosages may be increased if the patient fails to respond to the standard dosage, or 
decreased if the patient experiences unwanted side effects. Patients who fail to improve 
when taking one medication may be switched to another one.). 
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participant to discontinue participation) in response to the wants 
or needs of a particular participant.184 Third, a treating physician 
has a primary duty of loyalty to his or her patients and is 
charged with recommending treatments that the physician 
believes are in each patients best interests.185 On the other hand, 
researchers who do not also have a treatment relationship with 
their research participants generally are not considered to have a 
fiduciary or primary duty of loyalty to their research 
participants.186 In theory, investigators design (and research 
                                            
 184. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz, & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic 
Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and Risk Factors, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. 
RES., Mar.Apr. 2004, at 1, 1 (explaining that researchers are obligated to protect the 
validity of the data they generate [by] using . . . techniques [such] as randomized 
assignment, placebo control groups, double-blind procedures, and fixed treatment 
protocols, which often preclude personalized decisions from being made); Paul S. 
Appelbaum, Clarifying the Ethics of Clinical Research: A Path Toward Avoiding the 
Therapeutic Misconception, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Spring 2002, at 22, 22 (explaining that the 
use of randomization, double-blind procedures, adherence to strict protocols, and 
administration of placebos in research studies may be undertaken because they advance 
the scientific validity of the research study, rather than because they serve the subject); 
Dresser supra note 181, at 272 (Research methods that minimize ambiguity and bias in 
data collection rule out the individualized approach that is the hallmark of clinical care. 
In research, the intervention an individual receives is usually determined by random 
assignment instead of a physicians clinical judgment.). Although research participants 
have a legal right to withdraw from a research study at any time, they do not have the 
right to adjust, substitute, or change an experimental intervention. See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.116(a)(8) (2011). 
 185. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 173 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining that the goal of medicine is to promote 
the welfare of individual patients); COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. 
MEDICAL ASSN, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 374 
(2010) (Opinion 10.015) (The relationship between patient and physician is based on 
trust and gives rise to physicians ethical obligations to place patients welfare above their 
own self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their patients 
welfare. Within the patient-physician relationship, a physician is ethically required to use 
sound medical judgment, holding the best interests of the patient as paramount.); Natl 
Library of Med., Greek Medicine: I swear by Apollo Physician . . .: Greek Medicine from 
the Gods  to Galen, NATL INSTITUTES HEALTH, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2013) (containing 
the Hippocratic Oath, in which the physician pledges to benefit [the physicians] patients 
according to [the physicians] greatest ability and judgment). 
 186. See, e.g., Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 372 F. Supp.2d 416, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(refusing to find a fiduciary duty running from the sponsor of an independent research 
study to the individuals who participated in the research); Greenberg v. Miami Childrens 
Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp.2d 1064, 1072 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (refusing to find a 
fiduciary duty running from Canavan disease researchers to their research participants); 
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990) (explaining that the 
regents of the defendant university and its affiliated researchers were not physicians and 
therefore did not owe the plaintiff patient a fiduciary duty); Dresser, supra note 181, at 
292 (recommending that researchers explain to participants as part of the consent-to-
research process that the researchers primary loyalty is to future patients, not current 
research participants). Notwithstanding these cases, some attorneys who represent 
research participants continue to assert that the researcherparticipant relationship 
constitutes a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Alan C. Milstein, Research Malpractice and 
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participants consent to participate in) research protocols with the 
understanding of the differences between treatment and 
research187 and with the knowledge that research participation 
may not directly benefit the participant and may pose personal 
health risks to the participant.188 
Because treatment and research are intrinsically different 
activities, I worry that allowing research institutions to rely on 
legislation specifically designed and labeled for the treatment 
setting to answer research-related questions could provide 
continued legal and conceptual support for the therapeutic 
misconception. First coined in 1982, therapeutic misconception 
refers to the conflation of the goals of research with the goals of 
clinical care.189 With respect to research participants, a 
                                            
the Issue of Incidental Findings, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 356, 358 (2008) (Once the 
research subject or the guardian for a minor subject signs the informed consent document, 
a fiduciary relationship is formed between the PI [(Principal Investigator)] and the 
research subject. The very nature of scientific research on human subjects creates special 
relationships out of which fiduciary duties arise, similar to the physician/patient 
relationship. The fiduciary relationship is formed not only by the informed consent 
agreement between the parties, but also by the trust the subject necessarily places in the 
researcher. In the context of human subjects research, a special relationship is created 
between the human subject and those responsible for the design, approval, and 
implementation of the experiment because the latter have a duty to protect human 
subjects both under the Common Rule and common law. (footnote omitted)). In addition, 
some courts have found that researchers have special relationships with their research 
participants that can give rise to unspecified tort-like duties. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy 
Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 846 (Md. 2001) ([S]pecial relationships, out of which 
duties arise, the breach of which can constitute negligence, can result from the 
relationships between researcher and research subjects.). See generally Stacey A. Tovino, 
Incidental Findings: A Common Law Approach, 15 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 242, 
25054 (2008) (discussing the concepts of fiduciary duty and fiduciary relationships in the 
context of neuroimaging research). 
 187. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (2011) (requiring research participants to be 
informed that they are participating in research); 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (defining research 
as a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, 
[that is] designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge). As discussed in 
more detail below, some research participants and researchers may be operating under a 
therapeutic misconception. See infra text accompanying notes 189198. 
 188. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2011) (requiring research participants to be 
informed of reasonably foreseeable risks and discomforts before they may consent to 
participate in the research). 
 189. See Appelbaum, Lidz & Grisso, supra note 184, at 16 (defining therapeutic 
misconception with reference to research participants inappropriate assumption that 
decisions about their care are being made solely with their benefit in mind; and reporting 
data confirming that many research participants carry strong expectations that the 
research, like the therapy they may have received previously, is designed and will be 
executed in a manner of direct benefit to them); Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 22 
(explaining that Appelbaum and colleagues first described the therapeutic misconception 
phenomenon in 1982); Laura B. Dunn et al., Assessment of Therapeutic Misconception in 
Older Schizophrenia Patients with a Brief Instrument, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 500, 500 
(2006) (defining the therapeutic misconception as the conflation of the goals and 
procedures of clinical research with those of usual clinical care). 
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therapeutic misconception is said to occur when a participant 
transfers to the research setting the presumption that applies in 
the clinical setting, that is, the presumption that the physician is 
acting only with the patients best interests in mind.190 Studies of 
the nature and frequency of the therapeutic misconception (and 
of two related concepts, therapeutic misestimation and the 
therapeutic optimism) among research participants show that 
many research participants underappreciate research risks, 
unrealistically hope for direct therapeutic benefit, fail to 
recognize altruism and contribution to science as motives for 
participating in research, and, more generally, conflate research 
with clinical care.191 One of the most important concepts requiring 
communication during the consent-to-research process is the 
                                            
 190. See Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 22; Henderson et al., supra note 181, at 1736 
box 1 (Therapeutic misconception exists when individuals do not understand that the 
defining purpose of clinical research is to produce generalizable knowledge, regardless of 
whether the subjects enrolled in the trial may potentially benefit from the intervention 
under study or from other aspects of the clinical trial.). 
 191. See, e.g., Appelbaum, Lidz & Grisso, supra note 184, at 1, 27 (reporting the 
first systematic attempt to assess the frequency of [therapeutic misconception] across a 
range of clinical research projects; finding that 31.1% . . . of participants expressed 
inaccurate beliefs regarding the degree of individualization of their treatment . . . , while 
51.1% . . . manifested an unreasonable belief in the nature or likelihood of benefit; and 
concluding that subjects frequently overestimate the likely benefits of entry into research 
studies, underestimate risks, and conflate research with ordinary treatment); Christopher 
Daugherty et al., Perceptions of Cancer Patients and Their Physicians Involved in Phase I 
Trials, 13 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1062, 106467 (1995) (reporting data showing that 85% 
of thirty Phase I clinical trial research participants decided to participate in a Phase I 
trial for reasons of possible therapeutic benefit while only 33% completely understood the 
purpose of the trial in which they were participating; and concluding that patients who 
participate in Phase I trials are strongly motivated by the hope of therapeutic benefit and 
that altruistic feelings appear to have a limited and inconsequential role in motivating 
patients to participate); Dunn et al., supra note 189, at 50104 (examining the frequency 
of a key aspect of therapeutic misconception in eighty-seven middle-age and older patients 
with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder; and concluding that patients with 
schizophrenia show a substantial incidence of beliefs associated with therapeutic 
misconception); Charles W. Lidz et al., Therapeutic Misconception and the Appreciation of 
Risks in Clinical Trials, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1689, 168997 (2004) (reporting results from 
a study involving the interview of 155 research participants from forty different clinical 
trials at two different U.S. medical centers; and concluding that research participants 
often agree to participate in research with only the most modest appreciation of the risks 
and disadvantages of participation); Robin E. Matutina, The Concept Analysis of 
Therapeutic Misconception, 17 NURSE RESEARCHER, no. 4, 2010, at 83, 8687 (identifying 
elements present in therapeutic misconception, including patients confusing research 
with treatment, believing they will receive physical benefit from study participation, and 
failing to list altruism and contribution to science as motives for participating in the 
study). Some authors classify a research participants underappreciation of research risks 
and unrealistic hope for direct therapeutic benefit not as therapeutic misconception but, 
instead, as therapeutic misestimation or therapeutic optimism. See, e.g., Daniel S. 
Goldberg, Eschewing Definitions of the Therapeutic Misconception: A Family Resemblance 
Analysis, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 296, 299 (2011) (discussing therapeutic misconception, 
therapeutic misestimation, and therapeutic optimism). 
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difference between treatment and research and how a research 
study is different than what the patient would ordinarily 
encounter in the clinical setting.192 Failure to distinguish research 
from ordinary treatment and failure to understand the 
consequences of research participation (including the likelihood 
and nature of any risks and the potential lack of any direct 
medical benefit) can undermine true informed consent.193 
Part of the problem is that researchers themselves may be 
operating under a therapeutic misconception.194 Several studies, 
case reports, and histories suggest that some researchers (i) view 
the purpose of clinical trials as benefiting individual research 
participants rather than creating generalizable knowledge for the 
purpose of advancing future therapy;195 (ii) have an unreasonable 
expectation of their participants direct therapeutic benefit;196 and 
                                            
 192. See Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 23; Henderson et al., supra note 181, at 1735 
(Ethicists have argued that informed consent to participate in research should include 
clarification of the differences between [the] two activities [of treatment and research].). 
 193. See, e.g., Appelbaum, Lidz & Grisso, supra note 184, at 2 ([Therapeutic 
misconception] may constitute a major obstacle to meaningful decision-making.); 
Dresser, supra note 181, at 285 (The therapeutic misconception conflicts with the long-
standing and widely accepted research-ethics principle of respect for persons. This 
principle holds that morally permissible research takes place only when the studied 
individuals have made an informed and voluntary choice to participate. Patients who 
enroll in research without understanding how such participation will change the 
management of their condition are insufficiently informed. Such individuals have not 
given researchers valid permission to elevate scientific considerations above the 
individuals own best interests.); Dunn et al., supra note 189, at 500 (explaining that the 
therapeutic misconception may impede informed consent); Lidz et al., supra note 191, at 
1689 ([F]ailure to distinguish the consequences of research participation from receiving 
ordinary treatment may seriously undermine the informed consent of research subjects.). 
 194. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 23 (If we are to disabuse research 
subjects of unrealistic beliefs regarding the therapeutic benefits of participating in 
studies, surely we must first take the same step with the researchers 
themselves. . . . Confused investigators generate confused subjects; the latter then enroll 
in studies, seeking therapeutic benefits that are almost certain not to accrue.); Goldberg, 
supra note 191, at 30813 (examining why researchers also may be operating under a 
therapeutic misconception). 
 195. See, e.g., Steven Joffe & Jane C. Weeks, Views of American Oncologists About 
the Purposes of Clinical Trials, 94 J. NATL CANCER INST. 1847, 1851 (2002) (reporting the 
results of a survey studying American cancer specialists about their beliefs regarding 
clinical trials; concluding that many respondents viewed the main societal purpose of 
clinical trials as benefiting the participants rather than as creating generalizable 
knowledge to advance future therapy; and opining that this view conflicts with 
established principles of research ethics). 
 196. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 277 ([S]tudies find that physicians are at 
times unrealistically optimistic about an experimental interventions prospects.); 
Goldberg, supra note 191, at 308 (maintaining that some perpetrators of human subjects 
research abuses unreasonably believed the persons they experimented on would receive 
direct benefit); Gail E. Henderson et al., Uncertain Benefit: Investigators Views and 
Communications in Early Phase Gene Transfer Trials, 10 MOLECULAR THERAPY 225, 226
27 (2004) (finding that 46% (eighteen of the thirty-nine) investigators studied in early 
phase gene transfer research expected subjects in the trials to receive direct benefit). 
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(iii) use a patients or surrogates hope of cure or desire to receive 
treatment as leverage to obtain their consent to research 
participation.197 As one way of ensuring that research 
participants do not consent to research while under the guise of a 
therapeutic misconception, bioethicists and attorneys routinely 
recommend that researchers and their coordinators not 
personally harbor unrealistic beliefs about the benefits and risks 
associated with particular research protocols and be capable of 
appropriately distinguishing between evidence-based medicine 
and experimental research in oral and written communications 
with their potential research participants.198 
Notwithstanding the bioethics and legal communities 
widespread recognition of and concern regarding the therapeutic 
misconception, researchers, participants, and others continue to 
operate under its shroud.199 If, by federal agency recommendation,200 
                                            
 197. See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Dwarves: Uninformed Consent and Eugenic 
Research, 25 ETHICS & MED. 149, 14950, 15557, 159 (2009) (examining the plan of 
American biologist and eugenics leader Charles B. Davenport to conduct an experimental 
castration on a boy whom Davenport referred to as a Mongoloid dwarf; noting 
Davenports reliance on a speculative therapeutic justification (that of easing the boys 
marked eroticism) to justify the experiment and elicit consent from the boys mother; 
explaining, [Davenports] desire to use the excuse of therapeutic prerogative as the mask 
behind which to hide his true goalssuggesting that surgery was for the patients benefit 
rather than primarily to aid scientific discoveryindicates his sensitivity to the potential 
that others would find such research both legally and ethically problematic; and 
concluding: The researchers used the patients (or their surrogate decisionmakers) hope 
of cure, or at least acquiescence to treatment, as leverage for advancing an agenda more 
concerned with research than therapy). 
 198. See, e.g., Jessica Wilen Berg, Legal and Ethical Complexities of Consent with 
Cognitively Impaired Research Subjects: Proposed Guidelines, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 18, 
18 (1996) (remarking that judges and lawyers seek to ensure that research subjects 
rights are protected); Dresser, supra note 181, at 277 (reporting empirical evidence 
showing that patients . . . form impressions about research studies based on discussions 
with their personal physicians and may decide to participate in research very quickly if 
the physician urges participation); id. at 279 (referencing studies finding that research 
coordinators conflated research with treatment); Mildred K. Cho & David Magnus, 
Therapeutic Misconception and Stem Cell Research, NATURE REP. (Sept. 27, 2007), 
http://www.nature.com/stemcells/2007/0709/070927/full/stemcells.2007.88.html 
(referencing studies suggesting that researchers can and should guard against 
encouraging the therapeutic misconception, both in informed-consent forms and in 
publications; and concluding, in the context of stem cell research, that, although all 
researchers working with human subjects must guard against the therapeutic 
misconception, stem cell scientists have a particularly heavy burden to make sure that 
research donors and research subjects alike understand that, so far, experiments are 
exactly that). 
 199. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 198, at 19 (discussing concerns in the legal 
community); Dresser, supra note 181, at 276 (Despite widespread recognition of and 
expressed concern about the therapeutic misconception, investigators and physicians 
continue to promote it.); id. at 290 (Despite periodic expressions of concern, the research 
system and the larger society continue to tolerateand to promotethe conflation of 
research and therapy.); id. at 294 (Until now, beneficiaries of the therapeutic 
misconception have preferred to maintain the status quo.); Lombardo, supra note 197, at 
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we allow researchers to rely on legislation that by title and content 
applies to only the treatment setting, we may be continuing to blur 
important distinctions between treatment and research,201 at least 
at the legal level. Of course, state legislatures could quickly fix part 
of the problem by renaming202 and amending203 their consent-to-
treatment statutes to clarify that they also apply in the research 
setting. The more important substantive question is whether the 
content of state legislation governing consent to treatment is 
appropriate for the research setting. I argue that it is not for at least 
two different reasons. 
                                            
159 (Both informed consent and the therapeutic misconception remain major issues in 
research ethics today.). 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 114116. 
 201. See Appelbaum, supra note 184, at 23 (expressing similar concerns). 
 202. For example, the Texas Act could be renamed the Texas Consent to Medical 
Treatment and Research Participation Act, the New York Act could be renamed the New 
York Family Health Care and Research Participation Act, and the Washington Act could 
be renamed the Washington Informed Consent to Treatment and Research Participation 
Act. 
 203. By further example, the Texas Act could be amended with italicized additions 
and stricken deletions, as follows: 
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 313.004. 
Consent for Medical Treatment and Research Participation. 
(a) If an adult individual patient . . . in a hospital or nursing home . . . is 
comatose, incapacitated, or otherwise mentally or physically incapable of 
communication, an adult surrogate from the following list, in order of 
priority, who has decision-making capacity, is available after a reasonably 
diligent inquiry, and is willing to consent to medical treatment or research 
participation on behalf of the individual patient may consent to medical 
treatment or research participation on behalf of the individual patient: 
(1) the individuals patients spouse; 
(2) an adult child of the individual patient who has the waiver and 
consent of all other qualified adult children of the individual patient to 
act as the sole treatment or research participation decision-maker; 
(3) a majority of the individuals patients reasonably available adult 
children; 
(4) the individuals patients parents; or 
(5) the person individual clearly identified to act for the individual 
patient by the individual patient before the individual patient became 
incapacitated, the individuals patients nearest living relative, or a 
member of the clergy. 
(b) Any dispute as to the right of a party to act as a surrogate decision-
maker may be resolved only by a court of record having jurisdiction under 
Chapter V, Texas Probate Code. 
(c) Any medical treatment or research protocol consented to under 
Subsection (a) must be based on knowledge of what the individual patient 
would desire, if known. 
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a surrogate 
decision-maker may not consent to: 
(1) voluntary inpatient mental health services; 
(2) standard or experimental electro-convulsive treatment; or 
(3) the appointment of another surrogate decision-maker. 
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First, many state consent-to-treatment laws contain a 
patients wishes if known followed by the patients best 
interests standard for surrogate decision-making.204 Under the 
New York Act, for example, surrogates are required to make 
health care decisions (i) in accordance with the patients wishes, 
including the patients religious and moral beliefs; or (ii) if the 
patients wishes are not reasonably known and cannot with 
reasonable diligence be ascertained, in accordance with the 
patients best interests.205 Many commentators believe that the 
first standard, the patients wishes if known standard, works 
very well in the treatment setting and may also be used in the 
research setting without violating ethical and legal principles. 
That is, if an adult individual with decision-making capacity is 
informed of the nature of a particular research study and 
comprehends the known (and appreciates the existence of 
unknown) risks and benefits of the study, and expresses by clear 
and convincing evidence the individuals wish to be enrolled in 
the study in the event the individual loses decision-making 
capacity, many ethicists and attorneys would be comfortable with 
allowing the individual to be enrolled in the study if the study 
minimizes research risks and satisfies other federal 
requirements relating to human subjects research.206 The ethical 
principle of respect for autonomy and the legal principle of 
self-determination suggest that we should respect the 
competent individuals informed decision to participate in the 
study.207 
                                            
 204. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994d(4)(a) (McKinney 2012). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See, e.g., Palaniappan Muthappan, Heidi Forster & David Wendler, Research 
Advance Directives: Protection or Obstacle? 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2389, 2390 (2005) 
(Adults who are unable to provide informed consent should be enrolled in clinical 
research only with sufficient evidence that such enrollment is consistent with their 
competent preferences.); Saks et al., supra note 12, at 66 ([O]ne can imagine many cases 
of research with decisionally impaired people that would not be controversial to most 
people. Take the case, for example, of a person giving an advance directive consenting to a 
particular research study, prior to becoming decisionally impaired. Assume that the study 
involves known procedures and risks that have not changed over time and that the 
subject clearly understood when giving the advance consent.). 
 207. See, e.g., Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,193 (Apr. 18, 1979) (An 
autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about personal goals and of 
acting under the direction of such deliberation. To respect autonomy is to give weight to 
autonomous persons considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing 
their actions unless they are clearly detrimental to others. To show lack of respect for an 
autonomous agent is to repudiate that persons considered judgments [or] to deny an 
individual the freedom to act on those considered judgments . . . .); BEAUCHAMP & 
CHILDRESS, supra note 185, at 58 (The autonomous individual acts freely in accordance 
with a self-chosen plan . . . .). 
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The contingent standard, the patients best interests 
standard, also is believed to work well in the treatment setting 
because physicians have both an ethical and legal obligation to 
place their patients welfare above their own financial, economic, 
and other self-interests and to hold the best interests of their 
patients as paramount.208 Even in situations in which a patient 
lacks decision-making capacity, a surrogate who consents to a 
treatment on behalf of the patient should be consenting to a 
treatment that a physician is recommending because the 
physician believes the treatment is in the patients best 
interests.209 Of course, the patients best interests standard does 
not always work perfectly in the treatment setting. A careless 
physician may negligently recommend, order, or perform a 
particular medical treatment, for example, and the surrogate 
may have relied on the physicians treatment recommendation in 
making a decision to consent to the treatment on behalf of the 
patient. Or, a surrogate who stands to inherit a patients estate 
or otherwise has a conflict of interest may refuse to consent to a 
physician-recommended treatment that likely would have been 
in the patients best physical and mental health interests. In 
general, however, the patients best interest standard is 
believed to work well in the treatment setting because physicians 
have an ethical and legal duty to serve their patients best 
interests and most surrogates do in fact make health care 
decisions that they believe are in their patients best interests.210 
The problem is that the best interests standard may not 
work as routinely well in the research setting. Many biomedical 
and behavioral investigations are designed to study the safety 
and efficacy of experimental interventions.211 If an experimental 
intervention, such as an experimental new drug for Alzheimers 
                                            
 208. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 210. David I. Shalowitz, Elizabeth Garrett-Mayer & David Wendler, The Accuracy of 
Surrogate Decision Makers: A Systematic Review, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493, 495 
(2006) (detailing the results of studies that show surrogates correctly predicted patients 
preferred treatment with 68% accuracy). 
 211. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2010) (describing Phase I research studies, 
which are designed to determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of [an 
experimental] drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if 
possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness); 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (describing Phase 
II research studies, which are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of [a] drug for a 
particular indication or indications in patients with the disease or condition under study 
and to determine the common short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug); 
and 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (describing Phase III research studies, which are designed to 
gather the additional information about effectiveness and safety that is needed to 
evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of [a] drug and to provide an adequate basis 
for physician labeling). 
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disease or schizophrenia, has not yet been proven safe (and its 
efficacy has yet to be studied), an individual who is enrolled in a 
protocol studying the interventions safety may be subject to 
significant physical and emotional health risks and may not 
enjoy any direct therapeutic benefit.212 In the typical Phase I drug 
trial, for example, researchers assess a drugs safety, tolerability, 
pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics.213 Because only a very 
small percentage of individuals respond positively to 
experimental drugs tested in Phase I trials and because the 
chance of death and the likelihood of other side effects may be 
comparable to the chance of direct benefit, Phase I trials may not 
confer any aggregate survival advantage for research 
participants.214 Stated another way, it is very likely that research 
participation in a Phase I trial will not be in an individual 
research participants best physical and mental health 
interests.215 Of course, not all research studies are Phase I trials 
and some research studies do happen to benefit individuals who 
have the health condition under investigation. Generally 
speaking, however, many research studies are not in the best 
physical or mental health interests of their participants (even if 
it is in the researchers best interests to enroll the participants in 
the study).216 Stated slightly differently, the physicians, 
                                            
 212. See, e.g., ComplaintCivil Action, Gelsinger v. Trustees of the Univ. of Penn., 
(Pa. C. 2000), available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/files/gelsinger_complaint.pdf (lawsuit 
filed by parents on behalf of their eighteen-year-old son, Jesse Gelsinger, who died 
following his participation in Phase I gene research conducted at the University of 
Pennsylvania that was not expected to have any direct therapeutic benefit and that had 
killed monkeys during animal testing). 
 213. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ESTIMATING THE MAXIMUM SAFE STARTING 
DOSE IN INITIAL CLINICAL TRIALS FOR THERAPEUTICS IN ADULT HEALTHY VOLUNTEERS 2 
(2005) (describing the objectives of Phase I drug trials as assessment of the experimental 
therapeutics tolerability, pharmacodynamics, and pharmacokinetics). 
 214. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 191, at 305 (discussing the therapeutic misconception 
in the context of Phase I oncology trials); Matthew Miller, Phase I Cancer Trials: A Collusion of 
Misunderstanding, HASTINGS CENTER REP., JulyAug. 2000, at 34, 35; Dresser, supra note 181, 
at 275 (Phase I chemotherapy trials have very little chance of helping trial participants to live 
longer or feel better.); Robert Steinbrook, The Gelsinger Case, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF 
CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 110, 11112, 11415 (Ezekial J. Emanuel et al. eds., 2008) 
(discussing the Gelsinger lawsuit, which was settled by the University of Pennsylvania and 
involved a Phase I gene study that not only did not confer a survival advantage to the 
plaintiffs decedent son but also was dangerous to research participants). 
 215. Cf. Kim et al., supra note 12, at 801 (The . . . standard of best interests of the 
potential subject is problematic for research consent, since the point of research 
participation may not be for direct health benefits to the subject, although it is possible 
that a promising treatment may be available only within a research protocol and 
therefore the best-interest standard could at times be relevant.). 
 216. See Miller, supra note 214, at 3637 (describing the difficulty in reconciling the 
research trials methods with the patients expectations during patient enrollment). 
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surrogates, and patients interests usually are aligned in the 
treatment setting. In the research setting, the researcher has a 
duty to generate data that will contribute to generalizable 
knowledge, while the surrogate has a duty to carry out the 
prospective participants wishes or do what is in the participants 
best interests. Many times, a researchers need to enroll 
participants in a study will conflict with the surrogates 
obligation to do what is in the individuals best physical and 
mental health interests.217 
This problem is compounded by the fact that legislation 
governing consent to treatment is drafted in a manner that 
suggests that physician-recommended treatments usually are in 
a patients best physical and mental health interests, which fails 
to take into account the conflicts of interest that exist in the 
research context. Under the New York Act, for example, factors 
to be considered by the surrogate in assessing the patients best 
interests include the possibility and extent of preserving the 
patients life; the preservation, improvement or restoration of the 
patients health or functioning; [and] the relief of the patients 
suffering.218 These factors focus overwhelmingly on the prospect 
of therapeutic benefit. In order to be appropriate for the research 
setting, consent-to-treatment legislation would have to require 
consideration of the known, suspected, and unknown physical 
and emotional health risks associated with the experimental 
intervention and the individuals or surrogates comprehension of 
the likelihood that the intervention will yield no therapeutic 
benefit. 
So far, this Part has argued that treatment and research are 
intrinsically different activities, that government-supported 
reliance on legislation governing consent to treatment to answer 
research-related questions could provide continued legal and 
conceptual support for the therapeutic misconception, and that 
the content of legislation governing consent to treatment may be 
inappropriate for research-related questions because researchers 
have a duty to collect data and report research results, not to 
hold the best physical and mental health interests of their 
participants as paramount. Rather than relabeling legislation 
governing consent to treatment in an attempt to make it 
applicable to both the treatment and research settings,219 HHS 
should enact stand-alone consent-to-research regulations that 
specifically address the issues posed by research involving adults 
                                            
 217. See id. 
 218. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994d(4)(a) (McKinney 2012). 
 219. See supra notes 202203.  
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with impaired decision-making capacity and that take into 
account the potential conflicts of interest between and among 
researchers, surrogates, and participants. That is, HHS should 
adopt regulations that require researchers to recognize and 
convey to surrogates of prospective research participants who 
have impaired decision-making capacity (i) the conceptual 
distinctions between treatment and research; (ii) the specific 
differences between individualized, adaptable treatment methods 
and protocol-driven double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled 
research procedures; (iii) the known, suspected, and unknown 
risks associated with the research study;220 and (iv) the likelihood 
that the research participant may not directly benefit from the 
research.221 Why? Because federal and state regulations and 
statutes are part and parcel of the public discourse about human 
subjects research ethics, and they must convey a more balanced 
and nuanced understanding of the possible risks and benefits of 
research participation.222 
My proposal for research-specific regulations is supported by 
other substantive areas of health law that distinguish between 
treatment and research and establish more stringent 
requirements for research. In the context of health information 
confidentiality, for example, the federal Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule 
establishes the level of individual permission that is required 
before a covered entity may use or disclose the individuals 
protected health information (PHI) for a variety of activities, 
including treatment223 and research.224 Although the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule allows a covered entity to freely use and disclose an 
                                            
 220. See, e.g., Henderson et al., supra note 181, at 1737 box 2 (For intervention(s) 
under study in clinical research, there often is less knowledge and more uncertainty about 
the risks and benefits to a population of trial participants than there is when a doctor 
offers a patient standard interventions.); Lidz, supra note 191, at 1691. 
 221. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 181, at 285 ([H]ardly anyone acknowledges the 
relative scarcity of cases in which clinical-trial participants have their lives significantly 
extended or improved.); id. at 291 (recommending that researchers prepare one-page 
forms that highlight the differences between research and treatment and that emphasize 
participants low chance of directly benefiting from research participation); id. at 292 
(recommending that researchers provide participants with information regarding 
randomization, placebo groups, and other research methods; explain how study 
participants are treated differently than patients; and emphasize the nature and extent of 
the differences between treatment and research); id. at 293 ([R]esearchers must give 
patients stark, bold, and dramatic signs that research is different than clinical care.). 
 222. See id. at 293 ([P]ublic discourse about research must convey a more sober and 
qualified picture of what patients can gain and lose from enrolling in research studies.). 
 223. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a), (c)(1)(2) (2011). 
 224. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (establishing the level of individual permission that is 
required before a covered entity may use or disclose the individuals PHI for purposes of 
research). 
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individuals PHI for the covered entitys own treatment 
activities225 and to freely disclose an individuals PHI to another 
health care provider for the recipient providers treatment 
activities226 without obtaining the individuals prior authorization 
for the treatment use or disclosure, the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
regulates research activities much more stringently. When an 
individuals PHI will be used or disclosed for a research activity, 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires the individual to execute a 
prior written authorization form227 containing certain core 
elements228 and required statements,229 unless an institutional 
review board or a privacy board has approved a waiver of the 
otherwise required authorization form,230 or the individual is 
deceased,231 or the information will be used as part of a records 
review that is preparatory to research,232 or the information 
requested is a limited data set and the researcher has agreed to 
sign a data use agreement pursuant to which the researcher 
agrees to protect the confidentiality of the PHI.233 According to 
HHS, the reason for the more stringent regulation of research in 
the context of health information confidentiality is that 
individuals expect, when they request treatment from a health 
care provider, that their information will be used and disclosed 
for reasons relating to that treatment,234 but not for research 
purposes.235 The requirement for prior written authorization in 
                                            
 225. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1). 
 226. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(2). 
 227. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 82,462, 82,520 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified in 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (In the final rule, 
we . . . require covered entities to obtain an authorization for the use or disclosure of 
protected health information the covered entity creates for the purpose of research that 
includes treatment of individuals, except as otherwise permitted by § 164.512(i).). 
 228. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1) (listing the core elements). 
 229. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2) (listing the required statements). 
 230. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(i). 
 231. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(iii). 
 232. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii). 
 233. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(1), (e)(3)(4). 
 234. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., USES 
AND DISCLOSURES FOR TREATMENT, PAYMENT, AND HEALTH CARE OPERATIONS 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/ 
sharingfortpo.pdf (Many individuals expect that their health information will be used 
and disclosed as necessary to treat them . . . . To avoid interfering with an individuals 
access to quality health care or the efficient payment for such health care, the Privacy 
Rule permits a covered entity to use and disclose protected health information, with 
certain limits and protections, for treatment . . . .). 
 235. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 
64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,952 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 
(2011)) (Authorization would be required for these [nonhealth-care-related] uses and 
disclosures because individuals probably do not envision that the information they 
provide when getting health care would be disclosed for such unrelated purposes.). 
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the context of research is designed to alert the individual that a 
covered entity is seeking to use or disclose the individuals PHI 
for a research activity and to allow the individual to control the 
research-related information use or disclosure, including by 
allowing the individual to refuse to authorize the information use 
or disclosure.236 
Further, in the context of health insurance, both public 
health care programs and private health plans distinguish 
evidence-based medical treatments, on the one hand, and 
biomedical and behavioral experiments on the other. Through 
federal statutes and regulations governing the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs, HHS clarifies that such programs will cover 
health care items and services that are medically necessary, but 
not items and services that are not reasonable and necessary for 
the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury,237 including some 
experimental and investigative treatments.238 In their plan 
documents, private health plans also distinguish evidence-based 
medical treatments and medical experiments.239 For example, 
                                            
 236. See, e.g., id. (Further, once a patients protected health information is disclosed 
outside of the treatment and payment arena, it could be very difficult for the individual to 
determine what additional entities have seen, used and further disclosed the information. 
Requiring an authorization from the patient for such uses and disclosures would enhance 
individuals control over their protected health information.). 
 237. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395n(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (requiring a physician 
to certify the medical necessity of home health services, medical and other health services, 
outpatient physical therapy services, outpatient occupational therapy services, outpatient 
speech pathology services, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility services, and 
partial hospitalization services before Medicare will pay for such services); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (allowing Medicare Part A and B payments to be 
made only for reasonable and necessary health care items and services and excluding 
those items that are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness 
or injury). 
 238. See, e.g., BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF NORTH CAROLINA, MEDICARE C/D 
MEDICAL COVERAGE POLICY: INVESTIGATIONAL (EXPERIMENTAL) SERVICES (2012), 
http://www.bcbsnc.com/assets/services/public/pdfs/bluemedicare/medicalpolicy/investigatio
nal_services.pdf (generally excluding from coverage (with some exceptions) 
investigational and/or experimental services, defined as medical, surgical, psychiatric, 
and other health care services, supplies, treatments, procedures, drug therapies, or 
devices that are determined by the Plan to be either: (a) not generally accepted or 
endorsed by health care professionals in the general medical community as safe and 
effective in treating the condition, illness, or diagnosis for which their use is proposed, or 
(b) not proven by scientific evidence to be safe and effective in treating the condition, 
illness or diagnosis for which their use is proposed). 
 239. See, e.g., STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, 
LAS VEGAS 32 (20102011), https://wfis.wellsfargo.com/ProductServices/A%20to%20Z/ 
StudentInsurance/UNLV/graduatestudents/Documents/UNLV%2011%2012%20FINAL%2
0Aetna%20brochure.pdf; UPMC HEALTH PLAN POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL: 
EXPERIMENTAL AND INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, POLICY MP.079 (2012), 
http://www.upmchealthplan.com/pdf/pandp/pay.008.pdf (defining the technologies, 
devices, procedures, injectable drugs and biologics, vaccines and medical treatments that 
are generally not covered due to their experimental or investigative nature). 
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private health plans routinely except from coverage experimental 
and investigative services (and classify services as experimental 
or investigative if (i) [t]here [is] insufficient outcomes data 
available from controlled clinical trials published in the peer 
reviewed literature . . . to substantiate [the interventions] safety 
and effectiveness for the disease or injury involved; (ii) [i]f 
required by the FDA, approval has not been granted for 
marketing; (iii) [a] recognized national medical or dental society 
or regulatory agency has determined, in writing, that [the 
intervention] is experimental, investigational, or for research 
purposes; or (iv) the written protocol or protocols used by the 
treating facility . . . states that [the intervention] is experimental, 
investigational, or for research.240) 
Finally, in the context of human subjects research, even the 
Common Rule does not allow state-required consent-to-treatment 
forms241 to be used by an individual or a surrogate who is 
consenting to research if that state form does not comply with the 
Common Rule requirements. Instead, the Common Rule requires 
a research-specific consent form that includes certain basic242 and 
additional243 required elements, that has been approved by an 
IRB, and that has been signed by the subject or the subjects 
LAR.244 Importantly, the Common Rules first required element is 
that the consent-to-research form must state that the study 
involves research, not treatment.245 
V.  EMPIRICAL DATA ASSESSING LAY ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 
The previous Part argued that treatment and research are 
intrinsically different activities, that government-supported 
reliance on legislation governing consent to treatment to 
answer research-related questions could provide continued 
legal and conceptual support for the therapeutic 
misconception, and that the content of consent-to-treatment 
legislation may be inappropriate for research-related questions 
                                            
 240. Robert Taylor-Manning, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in 
Health Insurance Contracts: A Proposal For Judicial Response, 66 WASH. L. REV. 809, 809 
(1991); STUDENT HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS, 
supra note 239, at 32 (emphasis omitted). 
 241. See, e.g., 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 601.4(a)(1) (2012) (Tex. Med. Disclosure Panel, 
Informed Consent) (requiring Texas physicians to obtain a patients consent to treatment 
on a standard form). 
 242. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)(8) (2011) (listing eight basic elements). 
 243. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1)(6) (listing six additional elements). 
 244. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(a). 
 245. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1). 
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because researchers have a duty to collect data and report 
research results, not to hold the best physical and mental 
health interests of their participants as paramount. The 
previous Part further argued that HHS should adopt stand-
alone consent-to-research regulations that specifically address 
the issues posed by research involving adults with impaired 
decision-making capacity and that take into account the 
potential conflicts of interest between and among researchers, 
surrogates, and participants. To inform the content of such 
regulations, Part V argues that HHS should at least 
familiarize itself with the empirical literature that assesses 
lay attitudes towards human subjects research involving 
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity. 
As background, the current law review and other academic 
literatures tend to polarize conversations about the 
appropriateness of human subjects research involving 
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity into 
protectionist and autonomy-based arguments, on the one hand, 
and clinical- and research-based arguments made in support of 
further biomedical and behavioral research on the other.246 The 
current lack of federal regulation is, perhaps, a result of HHSs 
uncertainty regarding which of two binary positionsa 
protection-oriented position or a research-favorable position
HHS should adopt. This Part suggests that insights from the 
lay public, including current and potential patients and human 
subjects, may assist HHS in understanding the values of the 
laypersons its regulations are designed to protect.247 Until 
lawmakers better understand laypersons attitudes towards 
human subjects research involving individuals with impaired 
decision-making capacity, the willingness of laypersons to 
allow surrogates to make research participation decisions on 
their behalf, and the amount of leeway that laypersons would 
                                            
 246. See, e.g., AGS Ethics Committee, Informed Consent for Research on Human 
Subjects with Dementia, 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOCY 1308, 1308 (1998) (noting the debate 
over when research can be conducted on those with impaired decision-making capacity 
address[es] the tension between providing adequate protection for subjects who are 
vulnerable as a result of diminished capacity and allowing promising research to go 
forward); Berg, supra note 198, at 18, (When science takes man as its subject, tensions 
arise between two values basic to Western society: freedom of scientific inquiry and 
protection of individual inviolability. (citing JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN 
BEINGS 1 (1972)); DeRenzo, supra note 13, at 139 (While taking care that research not 
move forward so ruthlessly that we erode the fabric of our moral community, we must be 
equally careful not to impede unnecessarily needed ethically and socially acceptable 
research. (endnote omitted)). 
 247. See Kim et al., supra note 33, at 150 ([T]here have been very few attempts to 
understand the attitudes of the lay public or of stakeholder groups regarding [surrogate-
based research].). 
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grant their surrogates, lawmakers will struggle to craft 
regulations that reflect the values of such laypersons.248 
This Part thus analyzes empirical studies assessing current 
public attitudes regarding human subjects research involving 
adults with impaired decision-making capacity. As discussed in 
more detail below, these empirical studies somewhat surprisingly 
report that (i) surrogate consent to research is probably or 
definitely acceptable in the context of minimal risk research;249 
(ii) surrogate consent to research may be appropriate in the 
context of more risky studies;250 (iii) lay (or noncourt-appointed) 
surrogates should be permitted to consent to riskless research on 
behalf of relatives with impaired decision-making capacity;251 
(iv) enrolling individuals who are unable to consent to research in 
research studies that offer no potential for medical benefit is 
consistent with the preferences of at least some individuals and, 
therefore, should not be absolutely prohibited provided there is 
sufficient evidence that participation in such research is 
consistent with the preferences of such individuals;252 
(v) requiring a completed advance research directive (ARD) prior 
to research participation by an individual with impaired decision-
making capacity may be unduly restrictive in light of studies 
suggesting that the rate of ARD completion is likely to be low;253 
and (vi) allowing some or complete surrogate leeway, even over 
prior first-person consent, is consistent with the preferences of at 
least some individuals and should not be absolutely prohibited 
provided there is sufficient evidence that surrogate leeway is 
consistent with the preferences of such individuals.254 
Representative studies are examined below. 
In 2002, researchers from the NIH, the National Institutes 
of Mental Health, and the Center for Research Methodology and 
Biometrics in Denver published the results of a study designed to 
systematically assess, for the first time, the attitudes of healthy 
                                            
 248. See, e.g., Jason Karlawish et al., Older Adults Attitudes Toward Enrollment of 
Non-Competent Subjects Participating in Alzheimers Research, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
182, 183 (2009) (Until we better understand whether people are willing to participate in 
nonbeneficial research that enrolls persons with Alzheimers disease and why they are 
willing, policymakers cannot develop research ethics policies that respect the values of the 
people they are designed to protect and that will resolve the controversy that has caused 
some states and institutional review boards to limit substantially the practice of proxy 
consent for research.). 
 249. See infra text accompanying note 279. 
 250. See infra text accompanying notes 280283 and 293.  
 251. See infra text accompanying notes 267268 and note 274.  
 252. See infra text accompanying note 261. 
 253. See infra text accompanying note 262. 
 254. See infra text accompanying notes 289, 294, 298, and 300. 
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individuals who were familiar with clinical research (due to 
having a family history of Alzheimers Disease (AD) and prior 
research participation) towards five of the most prominent 
proposed safeguards for research participants with impaired 
decision-making capacity, that is, 1) restrictions on research 
with no potential for medical benefit, 2) formal research advance 
directives, 3) proxy decision makers, 4) restrictions on research 
not associated with the individuals impairments, and 5) respect 
for subjects dissent.255 
The study authors found that [t]he vast majority of 
respondents were willing to participate in clinical research if 
their ability to consent became impaired.256  
[Ninety-two percent] were willing to participate in a study 
that involved taking experimental medication that might 
help them; 80% were willing to take experimental 
medication that had no chance of helping them; 99% were 
willing to participate in a study that involved a computer 
task that would not help them; and 98% were willing to 
participate in a study involving two X-rays that would not 
help them.257 
With respect to their attitudes toward ARDs,  
[89% of respondents] said they were willing to fill out [an 
ARD] if asked to do so by their family, and . . . [86%] said they 
would be willing if asked by their doctor. Eighty-one percent 
said they preferred giving advance instructions rather than 
allowing their family to make research [participation] 
decisions for them [in the event of a loss of capacity to give 
first-person consent] . . . . Eighty-eight percent stated that 
their family could enroll them in research in the absence of 
[an ARD], and 80% stated that their families could enroll 
them in a potential benefit research even when their [ARD] 
opposed [research participation].258 
Finally, with respect to the completion of ARDs, few (only 
16% of the 246) ARD forms were actually completed by the 
subjects and returned to the subjects home research institution 
within one year.259 However,  
[95%] of the returned [ARDs] indicated a willingness to 
participate in research that offered a potential for medical 
                                            
 255. See Dave Wendler et al., Views of Potential Subjects Toward Proposed 
Regulations for Clinical Research with Adults Unable to Consent, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
585, 585, 589 (2002). 
 256. Id. at 586. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 589. 
 259. Id. 
Do Not Delete  2/18/2013  4:08 PM 
2013] A COMMON PROPOSAL 841 
benefit; 95% indicated a willingness to participate in 
minimal risk research with no potential for medical benefit; 
[and] 51% indicated a willingness to participate in greater 
than minimal risk research with no potential for medical 
benefit.260 
The study authors ultimately concluded that enrolling 
individuals who are unable to consent to research in a research 
study that offers no potential for medical benefit is consistent 
with the preferences of at least some individuals and, therefore, 
should not be absolutely prohibited provided there is sufficient 
evidence that research participation is consistent with the 
preferences of such individuals.261 The study authors also 
concluded that requiring such evidence to be provided in a formal 
ARD may be unduly restrictive, especially because so few of the 
respondents actually returned completed ARDs.262 
The following year, researchers from the University of 
Sherbrooke and the Sherbrooke University Geriatric Institute 
published the results of a questionnaire-based study designed to 
elicit the opinions of four different groups of concerned 
individuals (older adults, informal caregivers of cognitively 
impaired individuals, researchers in ageing [sic], and members of 
institutional review boards) regarding who should decide 
whether an older adult with impaired decision-making capacity 
will participate in research.263 The study questionnaire included 
(i) five questions describing hypothetical studies that 
progressively increased the risk to the subjects health, including 
spending a few hours per week with a pet (Question 1), a quality-
of-sleep study (Question 2), a new cream for treating bedsores 
(Question 3), an experimental drug designed to slow the progress 
of AD that carries the risk of constipation and dizziness 
(Question 4), and painful brain injections that could reverse the 
course of AD but that also involve serious risks of infection 
(Question 5); (ii) two more general questions exploring the 
conditions under which the respondent feels it is acceptable to 
solicit a cognitively impaired individual for research (Questions 
6 and 7); and (iii) a final, more personal question ask[ing] the 
respondents to specify in what cases they would agree that a 
concerned relative who lacks legal authority decide on their 
                                            
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 58990. 
 263. See Gina Bravo, Mariane Pâquet & Marie-France Dubois, Opinions Regarding 
Who Should Consent to Research on Behalf of an Older Adult Suffering from Dementia, 2 
DEMENTIA 49, 49, 5152 (2003). 
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behalf whether they will participate in a study, in the event that 
they themselves become mentally incapacitated (Question 8).264 
(As background, the then-current law in Quebec allowed family 
members to make healthcare decisions on behalf of patients with 
impaired decision-making capacity but allowed only court-
appointed legal guardians to consent to research on behalf of 
human subjects with impaired decision-making capacity.265) 
The study authors found that a significant proportion of 
those surveyed did not agree with the current law in Quebec.266 In 
fact, most respondents supported the participation of individuals 
with impaired decision-making capacity in research and would 
require the consent of a legal guardian only when risks were 
involved.267 Indeed,  
[i]n the absence of risk to the subjects health [(Questions 1 
to 3)], less than one-third of the respondents chose the legal 
guardian alone as the person best suited to make a 
substituted decision. As the hypothetical study became 
more risky [(Questions 4 and 5)], [the study authors found] 
an increase in the proportion of respondents who preferred 
that the surrogate decision-maker be legally appointed.268  
(However, the proportion of respondents who believed that 
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity should be 
excluded from the study also increased, [making] the choice of 
the best surrogate decision maker irrelevant.269) 
The study authors also found that [70%] of the respondents 
considered it acceptable to invite [older adults with impaired 
decision-making capacity] to participate in a hypothetical study 
that involved serious risks to their health [(Question 5)], mostly 
with the legal guardians consent.270 Opinions differed slightly 
when respondents were asked the two general questions 
(Questions 6 and 7) that lacked any context.271 More 
respondents, especially among older adults and informal 
caregivers, opted simply to exclude [individuals with cognitive 
impairments] from research.272 The study authors interpreted 
this finding as prudence [that] could be due to the vagueness 
                                            
 264. Id. at 52, 5457. 
 265. Id. at 50 (citation omitted). 
 266. See id. at 6162. 
 267. Id. at 63. 
 268. Id. at 6162. 
 269. Id. at 62. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
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inherent in the notion of risks and benefits.273 In the end, the 
study authors concluded that their findings suggested support for 
amending Quebec legislation to allow lay (or nonguardian) 
surrogates to consent to riskless research on behalf of relatives 
with impaired decision-making capacity.274 
In 2005, researchers from the University of Michigan and 
the University of Rochester Medical Center published the results 
of a study designed to elicit the views of those at heightened risk 
of [AD] regarding how they would balance the need for research 
in [AD] with the need to protect vulnerable [subjects with 
impaired decision-making capacity].275 Using a mailed 
questionnaire, the [study] authors surveyed the participants at 
one of the sites of the AD Anti-Inflammatory Prevention Trial276 
and measured responses regarding the acceptability of surrogate 
consent for [ten] research scenarios of varying degrees of risks 
and benefits, given from the perspectives of social policy, 
personal preferences for self, and preferences when deciding on 
behalf of a loved one.277 The ten research scenarios involved an 
observation, an interview, a blood draw, a magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) procedure, a lumbar puncture, a drug challenge, a 
biopsy, a drug randomized controlled trial (RCT), a vaccine, and 
a gene transfer.278 
Of the 229 participants who responded, a large majority 
(more than 90%) responded that surrogate consent to research 
was probably or definitely acceptable in the context of 
minimal risk research studies (including observation, interview, 
and blood draws) as well as RCTs of new medications.279 A 
smaller majority responded that surrogate consent to research 
was appropriate in the context of more invasive studies.280 For 
example, 56% of the participants responded that a brain biopsy 
study was probably or definitely acceptable and 54% 
responded that a gene transfer study was probably or 
definitely acceptable by society.281 The study authors further 
found that  
                                            
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 63. 
 275. See Scott Y.H. Kim et al., What Do People at Risk for Alzheimer Disease Think 
About Surrogate Consent for Research, 65 NEUROLOGY 1395, 1395 (2005). 
 276. Id. at 1395. [A]ll participants [were] 70 years old or older with at least one 
first-degree relative with dementia. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 1398 tbl.3. 
 279. Id. at 139597, 1398 tbl.3. 
 280. Id. at 1396. 
 281. Id. at 1396, 1398 tbl.3. 
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[t]he acceptability of [surrogate consent to research] was 
generally highest from the first-person perspective, then 
from the societal perspective, and lowest from a surrogates 
perspective of considering what to do for a loved one. For 
the lumbar puncture [research scenario], for example, 69%, 
65%, and 61% felt the study was [probably or definitely] 
acceptable from the point of view of self, society, and 
surrogate[, respectively].282  
The study authors ultimately concluded that laypersons at 
heightened risk of AD do discriminate among research scenarios 
of varying risks and burdens and that laypersons also are 
supportive of surrogate consent to research even when the risks 
and burdens are significant to the subjects.283 
In 2009, researchers from the University of Michigan, the 
University of Pennsylvania, the Mayo Clinic, and Columbia 
University published the results of a survey designed to assess 
the views of a nationally representative, policy-relevant sample 
of the general public (namely, older Americans) regarding 
surrogate consent for four research scenarios of varying degrees 
of risk and potential benefit as well as the extent of latitude or 
leeway that people would be willing to confer on their 
surrogates.284 [Following] a brief introductory background on AD 
and the rationale for the survey, a random subsample (n = 1,515) of 
the 2006 wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a 
biennial survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans 
aged fifty-one and older, were given one of four surrogate-consent 
based research (SBR) scenarios that approximated real studies in 
AD, including a lumbar puncture . . . , a randomized controlled 
trial . . . of a new drug, a vaccine study, and a first-in-human gene 
transfer neurosurgical study. . . . Then, the subjects were asked 
three questions, 285 including (i) If patients cannot make their own 
decisions about being in studies like this one, should our society 
allow their families to make the decision in their place?; 
(ii) Suppose you wanted to give a close family member instructions 
for the future, in case you ever became unable to make decisions for 
yourself. Would you say you would want to participate in the 
study?; and (iii) How much freedom or leeway would you give the 
close family member to go against your preference and 
instead . . . enroll/not enroll . . . you in the study?286 
                                            
 282. Id. at 139697. 
 283. Id. at 1399400. 
 284. See Kim et al., supra note 27, at 150. 
 285. Id. at 14950. 
 286. Id. at 150, 152 tbl.2. 
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Most of the respondents stated that . . . society should allow 
family [SBR] (67.5% to 82.5%, depending on the scenario)[287] 
and [that they personally] would . . . want to participate in 
SBR (57.4% to 79.7%).[288] Most respondents would also 
grant some or complete leeway to their surrogates (54.8% to 
66.8%), but this was true mainly of those willing to 
participate.[289]  
[A] significant minority (up to 45% for the gene transfer 
scenario) would not allow leeway.290 The study authors also 
found a trend toward lower willingness to participate in SBR 
among individuals who identified as racial or ethnic minorities.291 
The study authors formally concluded that [f]amily 
surrogate consent-based dementia research is broadly supported 
by older Americans and that [w]illingness to allow leeway 
to . . . surrogates needs to be studied further for its ethical 
significance for surrogate-based research policy.292 The study 
authors further concluded that even for invasive studies[,] the 
prior probability of an older Americans willingness to participate 
in SBR is high.293 The study authors also concluded that, even 
among those who are not willing to participate, there is a sizable 
minority who are willing to confer some leeway on their 
surrogates.294 The study authors recognized several limitations 
in their work, including the complicated scientific and policy 
issues surrounding surrogate consent for research, and the 
studys focus on dementia, which may not generalize to other 
areas of SBR.295 
Also in 2009, researchers from the University of 
Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia VA Medical Center published 
the results of a research study designed to assess willingness to 
have a surrogate make research participation decisions and, for 
each of two AD biomarker studies (including a minimal risk 
                                            
 287. The percentage of respondents providing positive responses for each of the four 
surrogate-based research scenarios for the first question (whether society should allow 
family surrogate consent) was 67.5% (gene transfer), 70.5% (vaccine), 72.0% (lumbar 
puncture), and 82.5% (drug randomized controlled study). Id. at 152 tbl.2. 
 288. The percentage of respondents providing positive responses for each of the four 
surrogate-based research scenarios for the second question (whether one would want to 
participate in the study) was 57.4% (vaccine), 68.7% (gene transfer), 70.8% (lumbar 
puncture), and 79.7% (drug randomized controlled study). Id. 
 289. Id. at 149, 15152 & tbl. 2. 
 290. Id. at 153. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 149, 15354. 
 293. Id. at 154. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
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blood draw and a greater than minimal risk blood draw and 
lumbar puncture), willingness to grant advance consent, and 
willingness to grant a surrogate leeway over advance consent.296 
Of the 538 persons age sixty-five and older who resided in the 
southeastern Pennsylvania region and participated in the study, 
the majority (83%) granted advance consent to a blood draw 
study and nearly half (48%) to a blood draw plus lumbar 
puncture.297 A large majority of the respondents (96%) were 
willing to identify a surrogate who would make research 
participation decisions and most were willing to grant their 
proxy leeway over their advance consent.298 Combining [their] 
preferences for advance consent and leeway, the proportion [of 
respondents] who would permit being enrolled in the blood draw 
and [spinal fluid samples studied], respectively, were 92% and 
75%.299 The study authors formally concluded that their data 
suggest that [o]lder adults generally support enrolling 
[individuals with impaired decision-making capacity associated 
with AD] into research that does not present a benefit to [such 
individuals] and that [w]illingness to grant [surrogate] leeway 
over advance consent and a favorable attitude [towards] 
biomedical research substantially explain[s such] willingness.300 
The proposals set forth in Part VI of this Article are designed to 
reflect, to some extent, the empirical data presented in this 
Part V. 
VI.  A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW SUBPART E TO THE COMMON RULE 
At least three options for the future regulation of research 
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity emerge. 
The first option is to continue our current system of no specific 
federal regulation and varying, if any, state regulation. This 
option would continue to give research protocol creation and 
approval discretion to researchers and IRBs, which have at their 
disposal nonbinding federal guidance and recommendations, 
including the OHRPs answers to the publics frequently asked 
questions, the SIIIDRs recommendations, and the NIHs Points 
to Consider. This option provides significant flexibility to 
researchers and IRBs, although research subjects may be under- 
or over-protected due to the lack of binding regulatory authority 
and significant researcher and IRB discretion. 
                                            
 296. See Karlawish et al., supra note 248, at 183. 
 297. Id. at 18385. 
 298. Id. at 182, 185. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 182, 186. 
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Second, an organization such as the Uniform Law 
Commission (ULC) could adopt a Uniform Research Involving 
Adults with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity Act that could 
serve as model legislation for states that do not have any 
research-specific provisions and for states that already have such 
legislation when that legislation is different than neighboring 
states. The ULC already has adopted other uniform health and 
safety-related laws, including the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(currently adopted by forty-five states and the District of 
Columbia)301 and the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act 
(currently adopted by six states).302 If adopted by all fifty states, 
this option would result in standard surrogate consent to 
research provisions, which would be especially helpful for 
researchers involved in multi-site, multi-state studies who 
currently must adhere to a number of varying state laws. Given 
that only six states have adopted the relatively noncontroversial 
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, it is unlikely that a majority 
of states would immediately adopt a Uniform Research 
Involving Adults with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity Act, 
thus resulting in a continuing patchwork of state law. 
Third, HHS could add new provisions to the Common Rule 
that would specifically govern, for the first time at the federal 
level, human subjects research involving adults with impaired 
decision-making capacity. The new provisions could be codified at 
45 C.F.R. Part 46 (Subpart E) and would follow the current Basic 
Policy for the Protection of Human Research Subjects (Subpart 
A) and the special regulatory provisions that already apply to 
pregnant women, fetuses, and neonates (Subpart B); prisoners 
(Subpart C); and children (Subpart D). This option would result 
in national research standards applicable to adults with impaired 
decision-making capacity. Depending on the particular standards 
that are adopted, however, research subjects could continue to be 
under- or over-protected. 
This Article supports the third option; that is, the addition 
by HHS of a new Subpart E to the Common Rule specifically 
governing human subjects research involving adults with 
impaired decision-making capacity. The first option is 
unacceptable because it promotes reliance on legislation 
                                            
 301. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Anatomical Gift Act (2006), UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Anatomical 
Gift Act (2006) (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
 302. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Health-Care Decisions Act, UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Health-Care 
Decisions Act (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
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governing consent to treatment to answer research-related 
questions, which I found in Part IV to be problematic because 
(i) treatment and research are intrinsically different activities; 
(ii) government-supported reliance on legislation governing 
consent to treatment to answer questions relating to consent to 
research could provide continued legal and conceptual support 
for the therapeutic misconception; and (iii) the content of 
legislation governing consent to treatment is inappropriate for 
research-related questions in light of the unique role of the 
researcher, that is, the role of collecting data and reporting 
research results, not holding the best physical and mental health 
interests of research participants as paramount. Although the 
substance of the second option could be virtually identical to the 
substance of the third option, I believe it unlikely that fifty states 
will adopt a Uniform Research Involving Adults with Impaired 
Decision-Making Capacity Act when only six states have, to 
date, adopted the relatively noncontroversial Uniform Health-
Care Decisions Act. 
This Article thus proposes the following structure for a new 
Subpart E to the Common Rule: 
45 C.F.R. PART 46 
Subpart E: Additional Protections Pertaining to Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research Involving Adults with Impaired 
Decision-Making Capacity 
§ 46.501: Applicability. 
§ 46.502: Purpose. 
§ 46.503: Definitions. 
§ 46.504: Additional Duties of Institutional Review Boards. 
§ 46.505: Minimal Risk Research. 
§ 46.506: Greater than Minimal Risk Research Involving 
the Prospect of Direct Benefit. 
§ 46.507: Greater than Minimal Risk Research Likely to 
Yield Generalizable Knowledge About Conditions Causing 
or Resulting in Impaired Decision-Making Capacity. 
§ 46.508: Additional Consent Form and Process 
Requirements. 
The first section, proposed § 46.501, would address the 
applicability of Subpart E. Specifically, § 46.501 would state that 
the regulatory provisions in Subpart E apply to all biomedical 
and behavioral research conducted or supported by the 
Department of Health and Human Services involving adults with 
impaired decision-making capacity. (If HHSs July 26, 2011 
proposal to expand the Common Rule to all [human subjects] 
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research, regardless of funding source, conducted at institutions 
in the [United States] that receive some Federal funding from a 
Common Rule agency is adopted,303 then proposed § 46.501 
would simply state that the regulatory provisions in Subpart E 
apply to all biomedical and behavioral research involving adults 
with impaired decision-making capacity conducted at an 
institution in the United States that receives some federal 
funding from a Common Rule agency.) Proposed § 46.501 also 
would specify that the requirements of Subpart E are in addition 
to, not instead of, those imposed under the other Subparts of Part 
46, including Subpart As Basic Policy for the Protection of 
Human Research Subjects. 
The second section, proposed § 46.502, would address the 
purpose of Subpart E. Specifically, proposed § 46.502 would 
explain that some individuals, due to neurological, psychiatric, 
developmental, and other conditions, are unable to comprehend 
sufficient information and may be incompetent to give informed 
consent to their own research participation. Proposed § 46.502 
also would explain, however, that additional research on the 
physical and mental health conditions that cause or result in 
impaired decision-making capacity remains necessary due to the 
lack of available treatments. Proposed § 46.502 should clearly 
state that it is the purpose of Subpart E to permit the conduct of 
responsible biomedical and behavioral investigations while 
providing additional safeguards for adults with impaired 
decision-making capacity. 
The third section, proposed § 46.503, would define specific 
terms used in Subpart E. Terms requiring definition would 
include, at a minimum, Adults with Impaired Decision-Making 
Capacity, Assent, Consent, Greater than Minimal Risk, 
Legally Authorized Representative, Minimal Risk, and 
Surrogate. Although many of these definitions can be taken 
from regulatory provisions codified elsewhere in the Common 
Rule, the definition of Adults with Impaired Decision-Making 
Capacity will be specific to Subpart E as will Surrogate. With 
respect to Adults with Impaired Decision-Making Capacity, 
HHS (through proposed regulations) should seek public comment 
on the range of physical and mental health conditions that cause 
                                            
 303. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 
44,512, 44,514 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164; 21 
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56) (discussing HHSs proposal to extend federal regulatory protection to 
all research, regardless of funding source, conducted at institutions in the [United States] 
that receive some Federal funding from a Common Rule agency for research with human 
subjects). 
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or result in impaired decision-making capacity that could be used 
to illustrate the types of persons who would be included in this 
definition. With respect to Surrogate, HHS (through proposed 
regulations) should seek public comment on the classes of 
individuals (and their relative order) who may make a research 
participation decision on behalf of an adult with impaired 
decision-making capacity. Given that some empirical studies 
support the use of lay surrogates (versus legal guardians, legal 
conservators, and other court-appointed surrogates) for decisions 
regarding research participation when the research involves only 
minimal risk,304 the identification and relative ordering of lay and 
legal surrogates should be carefully evaluated and should 
include, at a minimum, consideration of the following 
individuals: (i) the individuals agent pursuant to an advance 
research directive; (ii) the conservator or guardian of the 
individual; (iii) the spouse or domestic partner of the individual; 
(iv) an adult son or daughter of the individual; (v) a custodial 
parent of the individual; (vi) any adult brother or sister of the 
individual; (vii) any adult grandchild of the individual; and 
(viii) an available adult relative with the closest degree of kinship 
to the individual. Again, HHS (through proposed regulations) 
should solicit comments on the relative priority of these 
individuals. 
The fourth section, proposed § 46.504, would specify an 
additional duty of IRBs in research that involves adults with 
impaired decision-making capacity. Specifically, proposed 
§ 46.504 would require IRBs to find that there are good reasons 
to involve adults with impaired decision-making capacity as 
research subjects. Stated another way, IRBs would be required to 
find that a proposed research protocol can be conducted only if 
adults with certain neurological, psychiatric, developmental, and 
other physical and mental conditions are involved. If the research 
can be conducted with alternative (healthy) populations, then 
individuals with impaired decision-making capacity should not 
be enrolled in the research. The substance of proposed § 46.504 is 
supported by the current empirical literature, which reports wide 
agreement that individuals with impaired decision-making 
capacity should not be involved in research that can adequately 
be performed with healthy individuals with intact decision-
making capacity.305 Because there remains to be conducted 
important research on conditions that cause impaired decision-
making capacity that will require the inclusion of individuals 
                                            
 304. See supra text accompanying note 267. 
 305. Kim et al., supra note 12, at 79798. 
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with such conditions,306 the remainder of Subpart E (including 
proposed §§ 46.505507) are necessary. 
The fifth section, proposed § 46.505, would govern minimal 
risk research involving adults with impaired decision-making 
capacity. Specifically, proposed § 46.505 would state that 
minimal risk biomedical or behavioral research involving adults 
with impaired decision-making capacity may be carried out if 
(i) the research is relevant to the individuals condition; (ii) the 
individual has given prior consent to participate in such research 
through an ARD, or gives current assent to such research 
participation, or does not object to such research participation; 
and (iii) the individuals surrogate consents to the individuals 
research participation. This provision is supported by the current 
empirical literature that reports that laypersons support the use 
of lay surrogates for research participation decisions made in the 
context of minimal risk research307 Given that the empirical 
literature finds some, but not unanimous, support for surrogate 
leeway, additional empirical research should be conducted to 
assess laypersons desires with respect to the procession of 
minimal risk research when the individual objects but the 
experimental intervention holds out the prospect of direct benefit 
to the individual. 
The sixth section, proposed § 46.506, would govern research 
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity in the 
context of greater than minimal risk research that involves the 
prospect of direct benefit to the individual. Specifically, if a greater 
than minimal risk research study holds out the prospect of direct 
benefit for an individual, proposed § 46.506 would clarify that such 
research may proceed, but only if (i) the intervention that holds out 
the prospect of direct benefit is only available in the context of 
research; (ii) the risk is justified by the prospect of benefit to the 
subjects; (iii) the relation of the risk to the anticipated benefit is at 
least as favorable as that presented by available alternative 
approaches; (iv) the individual has given prior consent to participate 
in such research through an ARD, or gives current assent to such 
research participation, or does not object to such research 
participation; and (v) the individuals LAR consents to the 
individuals research participation. This proposal is supported by 
the current empirical literature that reports support for the conduct 
of greater than minimal risk research that holds out the prospect of 
direct benefit.308 
                                            
 306. Id. at 798. 
 307. See supra text accompanying notes 267 & 274. 
 308. Beattie, supra note 23, at S2728; Kim et al., supra note 12, at 801 (For [adults 
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The seventh section, proposed § 46.507, would govern 
research involving adults with impaired decision-making 
capacity in the context of greater than minimal risk research 
that does not involve the prospect of direct benefit. Perhaps the 
most controversial, this provision would answer the question 
whether it is permissible to enroll incapacitated individuals in 
risky research that likely will not benefit them. As discussed 
in more detail in Part V, the current empirical literature does 
not support an outright prohibition on this type of research. 
That is, such research is consistent with the preferences of at 
least some individuals309 who perhaps recognize that gene 
transfer studies, vaccine studies, immunotherapy, and drug 
studiesalthough posing significant health and other risks
can form the basis of future safe and efficacious treatments.310 
Proposed § 46.507 would allow such research, but only if (i) the 
anticipated knowledge is of vital importance for the 
understanding or amelioration of the type of disorder or 
condition of the individual; and (ii) the individual has given 
prior consent to research participation of this type involving 
greater than minimal risk and no prospect of direct benefit 
through an advance research directive; or (iii) the individual 
gives current assent to research participation and the 
individuals LAR consents to the individuals research 
participation, but only after a finding of clear and convincing 
evidence that research participation is consistent with the prior 
expressed preferences of the individual. The requirement for 
clear and convincing evidence that research participation is 
consistent with the individuals prior expressed preferences 
will prevent the involvement and exploitation of vulnerable 
research participants who would not have wanted to 
participate in such research, but will respect the autonomy of 
individuals who, for altruistic or other reasons, would have 
wanted to participate in the research. The requirement for 
clear and convincing evidence mirrors the type of evidence that 
is required by many states with respect to the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from individuals who, 
due to their conditions, are not able to express their consent to 
such withholding or withdrawal.311 
                                            
who lack decision-making capacity], there is little controversy that research 
involving . . . anticipated direct benefit to the subject that is reasonable in relation to the 
risk [is permissible].). 
 309. See supra text accompanying notes 261 & 293. 
 310. See, e.g., Beattie, supra note 23, at S2930; Kim et al., supra note 12, at 798. 
 311. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11(c) (Lexis Nexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, 
§§ 3080.3, 3080.4(A)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012). 
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A final section, proposed § 46.508, is necessary to deal with 
the likelihood of subject, surrogate, and researcher therapeutic 
misconception. That is, proposed § 46.508 would require 
researchers to convey to subjects and surrogates during the 
informed consent conversation, as well as to include in the 
consent-to-research form, language addressing (i) the conceptual 
distinctions between treatment and research; (ii) the specific 
differences between individualized, adaptable treatment methods 
and protocol-driven, double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled 
research procedures; (iii) the known, suspected, and unknown 
risks associated with the research protocol; and (iv) the likelihood 
that research participants may not directly benefit from the 
research. Language addressing these topics would be in addition 
to the other consent form and process requirements set forth in 
Subpart A of the Common Rule.312 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has proposed that HHS amend the Common 
Rule to add a new Subpart E governing human subjects research 
involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity. 
Although HHS has amended the Common Rule several times 
over the last few decades, [the regulations] have not kept pace 
with the evolving human research enterprise, including the 
marked increase in the volume of biomedical and behavioral 
research, the proliferation of multi-site clinical trials and 
observational studies, the expansion of research in particular 
areas, including neurology and psychiatry, and the use of new 
research technologies, including functional magnetic resonance 
imaging.313 Stakeholders have criticized the decades-old 
regulations on many grounds, including the extent and quality of 
the protections afforded by the regulations consent provisions, 
the lack of calibration between the risks posed by a particular 
research protocol and the required level of institutional review, 
and the multiple . . . [and] differing regulatory requirements 
that can apply to a single research study.314 The proposals in this 
Article not only respond to these criticisms in the context of 
                                            
 312. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011) (establishing the general requirements for 
informed consent to research participation); 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (2011) (establishing 
requirements relating to the documentation of informed consent to research 
participation). 
 313. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 
44,512, 44,51213 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164; 
21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56). 
 314. See id. at 44,51314. 
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research involving adults with impaired decision-making 
capacity, but they also create an appropriate balance among 
competing interests, that is, the protection of vulnerable human 
research subjects, the respect for (and promotion of) research 
subject autonomy, and the need for additional research into the 
neurological, psychiatric, developmental, and other conditions 
that result in impaired decision-making capacity. 
